



**CAMPAIGN FINANCING FOR THE 2025  
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA:  
SOURCES, EXPENDITURES AND  
REPORTING TRANSPARENCY**

March, 2026



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# Introduction

On 11 May 2025, Albania held its parliamentary elections, in which 11 electoral subjects—political parties and party coalitions—competed with a total of 2,046 candidates on multi-member lists. The race was characterized by the dominance of the two main political forces: the Socialist Party, as the ruling party, and the coalition “PD–Alliance for a Magnificent Albania,” led by the Democratic Party and composed of several allied parties, including the Freedom Party. Alongside them, several new political actors participated in these elections for the first time, such as the Opportunity Party, the Together Movement, and the coalition “Initiative–Albania Becomes,” formed by Nisma Thurje, the Albania Becomes Movement and the League for the Rights of Albanian Workers.

The final election results awarded the Socialist Party 83 seats in Parliament, securing a fourth consecutive governing mandate. The coalition “PD–Alliance for a Magnificent Albania” won 50 seats. The remaining seats were distributed among the Opportunity Party (2), the Together Movement (1), the coalition “Initiative–Albania Becomes” (1), and the Social Democratic Party (3).

The electoral campaign took place in a polarized political environment and was largely dominated by discourse focused on the leading figures of the main parties rather than on substantive programmatic debates. The Socialist Party built its campaign around the objective of European integration by 2030, while the opposition focused primarily on criticism of the government. Smaller political actors, particularly those competing for the first time, had limited opportunities for promotion, especially in traditional media.

The campaign also unfolded intensively on social media platforms, mainly Facebook and Instagram. The closure of the TikTok platform by government decision in March 2025 affected the digital communication ecosystem, particularly for parties and candidates with more limited resources. Although advertising and communication on social media remain only partially regulated under electoral legislation, political parties signed a Code of Ethics for Digital Campaigns<sup>1</sup>.

Another innovation in these elections was diaspora voting. For the first time, voting from abroad was implemented through postal voting, a process that posed logistical and administrative challenges for the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Diaspora voting also directly influenced campaign strategies, with meetings organized abroad by major political actors and increased media attention on this issue.

The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR Office<sup>2</sup> on these elections noted that the playing field was not fully level and that the ruling party benefited from the use of administrative resources, blurring the distinction between the state and the party. The report also highlighted allegations of pressure on public administration employees, the influence of patronage networks, as well as persistent phenomena such as vote-buying and the involvement of criminal groups.

In this political and institutional context, the financial dimension of the campaign assumes particular importance for assessing the fairness of the electoral contest and the transparency of the electoral process.

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<sup>1</sup> Likmeta, B., & Voko, K. (2025). *Social media monitoring: Albania's parliamentary elections 2025* [Monitorimi i rrjeteve sociale: Zgjedhjet parlamentare në Shqipëri 2025]. International IDEA. [https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2025-07/social-media-monitoring-albanias-parliamentary-elections-2025\\_0.pdf](https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2025-07/social-media-monitoring-albanias-parliamentary-elections-2025_0.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> OSCE/ODIHR. (2025). *Republic of Albania: Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2025 – Final Report* [Republika e Shqipërisë: Zgjedhjet parlamentare, 11 maj 2025 – Raporti përfundimtar]. <https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/0/c/600028.pdf>

## Regulatory framework

In order to carry out their regular activities, as well as to conduct electoral campaigns, political parties require financial resources. The legal framework in force, including the Electoral Code<sup>3</sup> and the Law on Political Parties<sup>4</sup>, defines the sources of financing for political parties. At the same time, the Constitution<sup>5</sup> stipulates that the finances of political parties must always be made public. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is the key institution which not only allocates the funds designated for political parties from the state budget, in accordance with the law, but also supervises and controls their finances. The CEC is also responsible for publishing the financial reports of political parties.

Political parties are financed through both public and non-public funds. According to the Law on Political Parties, public funds are distributed to political parties in the form of financial assistance from the state budget in proportion to the number of MPs and the number of votes they obtained in the most recent parliamentary elections, provided that they have submitted the annual financial report for the previous year. To carry out their regular activities, the law provides for other sources of financing, such as membership contributions and non-public funds including monetary donations, in-kind contributions or services, sponsorships, loans, or other financial transactions. Political parties may not be financed by foreign governments or foreign public or private entities, nor by domestic public entities or entities with state capital participation. They are allowed to receive donations and funding from political parties or international party associations, political organisations and foundations, domestic and foreign, as well as from Albanian citizens and domestic legal entities.

The Electoral Code, on the other hand, regulates the financing of electoral campaigns by political parties. In this context, the Electoral Code defines four sources of campaign financing:

- a) the state budget;
- b) the subject's own revenues;
- c) donations (monetary, in-kind or services); and
- d) loans and credits obtained by political parties and their candidates.

For the purposes of campaign financing, electoral subjects may receive non-public funds only from domestic natural and legal persons, and the amount (or the equivalent value in goods or services) that a natural or legal person may give to an electoral subject or its candidates may not exceed one million ALL. In February 2025, the Electoral Code introduced the concept of candidate self-financing. Under the new provision, candidates may self-finance their campaigns up to three million ALL, which must be declared both by the candidate and by the electoral subject to which they belong in the campaign financial report.

Foreign donations are not permitted. In order to identify and prevent conflicts of interest, unlawful influence in politics, and the abuse of state resources, the Electoral Code establishes a number of restrictions on donors who have benefited from public funds, public contracts or concessions, operate in the media sector, or have outstanding financial obligations toward public institutions.

The Electoral Code also sets a limit on the amount of expenditures that an electoral subject may incur for campaign purposes. With amendments to the Code adopted in February 2025, this limit was increased from three times to five

<sup>3</sup> Law No. 10019, dated 29.12.2008, "Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania," as amended. <https://kqz.gov.al/pdf/kodi-zgjedhor.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Law No. 8580, dated 17.02.2000, "On Political Parties," as amended. <https://kqz.gov.al/pdf/ligji-per-partite-politike-2020.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Law No. 8417, dated 21.10.1998, "Constitution of the Republic of Albania," as amended. <https://kqz.gov.al/pdf/kushtetuta-ndryshuar.pdf>

times the highest amount received by an electoral subject from public funds. The amendment also excluded candidates' expenditures from the calculation of the total campaign spending limit for an electoral subject. While the purpose of expenditure limits in electoral campaigns is to preserve a "level playing field" among competitors, the implications of the amended provision—raising the ceiling and excluding candidate spending—favour political parties with greater financial resources, particularly larger parties well established in the political and electoral landscape.

Political parties are required to report their finances—both revenues and expenditures—on an annual basis under the Law on Political Parties, and specifically for electoral campaigns under the Electoral Code. Electoral subjects, including political parties and independent candidates, must submit their campaign financial reports to the CEC within 60 days of the announcement of the final election results. Candidates on multi-member lists are required to submit financial reports to the political party to which they belong within 30 days following this deadline. The CEC Regulatory Commission approves in advance the reporting formats and the relevant guidelines. For the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025, these secondary legal acts included:

1. Decision No. 11, dated 27 February 2025, of the Regulatory Commission, "On certain amendments to Decision No. 18, dated 14 April 2021, of the Regulatory Commission 'On the approval of guidelines for financial reporting by political parties, candidates on multi-member lists and candidates nominated by voters for electoral campaigns for elections to the Assembly of Albania"; and
2. Decision No. 12, dated 27 February 2025, of the Regulatory Commission, "On certain amendments to Decision No. 13, dated 6 April 2021, of the Regulatory Commission 'On determining the rules for financial reporting by electoral subjects, the control and verification of their campaign financing and expenditures'".

The financial reports of political parties are audited by licensed chartered auditors (statutory auditors) selected by lot by the CEC. The audit report, including findings and recommendations, is submitted to the CEC within the prescribed deadlines. The CEC conducts control and verification by comparing the data contained in the campaign financial reports with the audit reports. Based on the findings, and where violations are identified, the State Election Commissioner may impose administrative sanctions on political parties.

Another important aspect of the regulatory framework governing electoral campaigns concerns the prohibition of the misuse of public resources (Article 91 of the Electoral Code) and the obligation of public institutions to report public activities during the four months preceding elections (Article 92 of the Electoral Code). Decision No. 9/2020<sup>6</sup> of the Regulatory Commission further details these provisions, while amendments adopted in 2025 expanded the definition of "public activity" to include digital and online platforms.

The CEC has mechanisms in place to monitor the four-month pre-election period through field monitors appointed by the institution to observe the conduct of the campaign and the behaviour of electoral subjects and public institutions, and to report potential violations. Media coverage of the electoral campaign is monitored by the Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA), which also reports regularly to the CEC.

### Purpose of the analysis

In this political and regulatory context, this analysis aims to provide a detailed, structured and independent overview of campaign financing for the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025. The report examines the structure of

<sup>6</sup> Decision No. 9, dated 24.12.2020, "On the rules for reporting public activities of public institutions, agencies and/or state-owned enterprises, the categories of prohibited activities, as well as the monitoring of the activities, conduct and use of human, financial and logistical resources of the state administration prior to elections," as amended.

political parties' revenues and expenditures, the financial concentration at both party and electoral subject level, sources of funding, budgetary priorities, as well as elements that raise questions regarding transparency, proportionality and the traceability of funds.

The analysis is not limited to the total values declared, but seeks to understand how electoral campaigns were financially structured, which expenditure categories dominated campaign spending, how concentrated the sources of financing were, and what financing models were followed by both major and smaller electoral actors. In this context, the report addresses both the individual party level and the level of electoral subjects competing in coalitions, in order to reflect the actual structure of the electoral competition.

By examining not only the volume of funds but also their distribution across the main expenditure categories, suppliers and payment methods, the report aims to identify structural trends in political financing in Albania. Particular attention is given to the concentration of funds in several strategic categories, the use of consultancy services, investments in traditional and digital media, as well as the level of outstanding liabilities at the end of the reporting period.

An important dimension of the analysis is the assessment of the equality of competition conditions from a financial perspective. By comparing the relative weight of revenues and expenditures between the main electoral actors and smaller political subjects, the report contributes to the broader debate on the effectiveness of legal limitations, campaign expenditure ceilings and rules governing funding sources. In particular, the analysis seeks to highlight whether the legal amendments introduced in 2025 have influenced the structure of political financing and the competitive balance among political actors.

The report also aims to contribute to strengthening the culture of transparency and accountability in political financing by documenting not only the declared data but also the inconsistencies, gaps and limitations identified in the

reporting process. Through this approach, the analysis provides a factual basis for oversight institutions, civil society organisations, the media and the public to assess the financial integrity of electoral processes.

In this way, the report seeks to serve as an analytical instrument for improving the regulatory framework and financial reporting practices, supporting the development of higher standards of transparency and oversight in the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns in Albania.

# Methodological Note

This report presents an analysis of the revenues and expenditures declared by political parties participating in the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025, based on the financial reports submitted to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The methodology applied maintains coherence with the analysis conducted for the 2023 electoral campaign, enabling comparability between electoral cycles, while also reflecting the legal amendments and the challenges identified in the reporting process for 2025.

The main source of data consists of the financial reports submitted by political parties through the CEC's electronic financial reporting platform. During the analytical process, considerable difficulties were encountered in the functioning of the online system, including lack of access to certain annexes, documents uploaded in unreadable formats, and inconsistencies between summary and detailed data. To ensure the completeness of the analysis, the authors submitted formal requests for access to information to the CEC, through which they obtained official copies of the financial reports submitted up to the end of 2025. The documentation obtained through this procedure served as a reference basis for verification and integration into the analysis.

All declared financial data were manually extracted and organised into a dedicated electronic database developed specifically for this purpose. The process included the individual recording of each revenue and expenditure transaction, categorisation by expenditure type, identification of the reporting entity, registration of suppliers in the case of expenditures, and the identification of outstanding liabilities. At the conclusion of this process, the database included 2,935 individual transactions of revenues and expenditures declared by 33 political parties that submitted financial reports, including those that declared zero values.

In accordance with the legal framework, the obligation for financial reporting lies with each political party individually. For this reason, the main financial analysis is conducted at the party level, reflecting the individual responsibility for reporting. However, given that 39 parties competed under the banner of 11 electoral subjects, the report also includes aggregated analysis at the level of the electoral subject. This approach makes it possible to assess financial concentration not only at the party level but also within the actual structure of the electoral competition, identifying the overall financial weight of each electoral subject.

During the data processing stage, cases of financial transfers between political parties were identified, particularly within the framework of coalition arrangements. These transactions appear as an expenditure for the transferring party and as revenue for the receiving party, creating the risk of double counting in aggregated analyses. To avoid this effect, the authors applied system-level corrections by excluding inter-party transfers from the calculation of the overall totals of revenues and expenditures. In the individual party analyses, transactions are retained as declared in the official reports submitted to the CEC, while in the aggregated totals corrected figures are presented in order to reflect the actual level of funds circulating within the system.

Amendments to the Electoral Code adopted prior to the elections excluded the revenues and expenditures of parliamentary candidates from the calculation of the campaign spending ceiling applicable to electoral subjects. In practice, declarations related to candidates proved to be partial and inconsistent across parties. To maintain comparability and avoid distortions in the results, this analysis excludes the partial declarations of revenues and expenditures reported by parliamentary candidates. Candidate finances will be addressed in a separate analysis.

The analysis is subject to several limitations related to the quality and completeness of financial reporting. A number of parties did not submit financial reports or declared zero values, limiting the ability to assess their actual financial activity. In some cases—particularly for the subjects Opportunity (Mundësia) and Albania Becomes Movement (Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet)—the submitted reports lacked detailed information on individual transactions or contained readability issues. In these cases, the analysis relied on the total values declared for each expenditure category, without the possibility of conducting a full transaction-level or supplier-level analysis. These limitations are explicitly noted in the relevant tables and methodological notes.

Despite these limitations, the analysis aims to provide the most accurate and balanced overview possible of the financial dynamics of the campaign for the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025, transparently documenting the sources of data, the corrections applied and the limits of interpretation. Methodological transparency is essential to enable independent verification and to contribute to improving financial reporting standards in future electoral processes.

# Key Findings

This chapter presents the analysis of the financial data submitted by political parties participating in the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025, based on the reports filed with the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The analysis focuses primarily on the party level, taking into account the individual legal obligation for financial reporting, while also reflecting their organisation under 11 electoral subjects. The data have been processed and structured in a way that allows for comparability between parties and enables the identification of structural trends in the concentration of revenues and the distribution of expenditures.

The findings highlight a high level of financial polarisation in the electoral race, significant differences in the capacity to generate financial resources and in the structure of campaign investments, as well as issues related to the quality and completeness of financial reporting in certain cases. Through the analysis of revenue structures, expenditure categories and their concentration among key suppliers, this chapter aims to provide a clear overview of the financial dynamics of the campaign for the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and to identify the factors that directly affect the transparency and fairness of the electoral competition.

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## Reporting entities and level of compliance with financial reporting obligations

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In the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025, 39 political parties competed, organised under the banner of 11 electoral subjects<sup>7</sup>. In accordance with the legislation in force, each of these parties was required to submit its campaign financial report to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) by 4 November 2025.

Table 1 presents the full list of political parties and competing coalitions, as well as the financial reporting status of each party as of 31 December 2025. This table constitutes the reference basis of the analysis and defines the universe of entities included in this report.

An examination of the reporting status shows that although the majority of parties submitted some form of financial report, the level of compliance with the legal obligation varies significantly.

More specifically:

- 5 parties (12.8% of the total) have no financial declaration recorded in the CEC system: Aleanca Demokracia e Re; Aleanca e Maqedonasve për Integrimin Europian; Bashkimi Liberal Demokrat; Aleanca Arbnore Kombëtare; Aleanca Europiane Ekologjike.
- 11 parties (28.2%) submitted declarations with a value of 0, reporting no revenues or expenditures during the campaign period.
- 2 parties (5.1%), Partia Kristian Demokrate and Rrugë e Vërtetë Shqiptare, submitted their reports after the legal deadline, but in these cases as well the declared amount is 0.

In total, 18 out of 39 parties (46.1%) either did not submit a financial report at all or declared zero financial activity. This means that nearly half of the parties participating in the electoral race do not appear to have independently reported financial activity during the 2025 parliamentary campaign.

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<sup>7</sup> In the narrative sections of this report, the names of the major political parties and coalitions are translated into English, with the Albanian original provided in brackets at first mention. In tables and datasets, all party names are presented in their original Albanian form to ensure consistency with official electoral documentation and facilitate identification.

**Table 1: Competing political parties and financial reporting status**

#	Electoral subject / coalition	Political party	Party leader / governing body	Financial report submitted
1	Aleanca Demokracia e Re	Aleanca Demokracia e Re	Edmond Stojku	NO
2	Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	Elena Kocaqi	YES
3	Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar	Dashamir Shehi/Eqerem Spahiu	YES
4	Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	Djathtas 1912	Kolegji Politik (organ drejtues)	YES
5	Koalicioni Euroatlantik	Koalicioni Euroatlantik	Endri Hasa	YES
6	Lëvizja Atdheu	Lëvizja Atdheu	Kreshnik Osmani	YES*
7	Lëvizja Bashkë	Lëvizja Bashkë	Arlind Qori	YES
8	Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	Adriatik Lapaj	YES
9	Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	Nisma Thurje	Endri Shabani	YES
10	Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	Lidhja për të Drejtat e Punëtorëve Shqiptarë	Marjus Malaj	YES*
11	Partia Mundësia	Partia Mundësia	Agron Shehaj	YES
12	Partia Socialdemokrate	Partia Socialdemokrate	Tom Doshi	YES
13	Partia Socialiste	Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	Edi Rama	YES
14	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Demokratike	Sali Berisha	YES
15	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia e Lirisë	Ilir Meta	YES
16	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Demokristiane e Shqipërisë	Nard Ndoka	YES*
17	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit	Shpëtim Axhami	YES
18	PD - Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Kristian Demokrate	Dhimitër Muslia	YES**
19	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Kombëtare Konservatore Albania	Kujtim Gjuzi	YES*

20	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Balli Kombëtar Demokrat	Artur Roshi	YES*
21	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Bashkimi Demokrat Shqiptar	Ylber Valteri	YES*
22	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Balli Kombëtar	Adriatik Alimadhi	YES
23	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Bashkimi për të Drejtat e Njeriut	Vangjel Dule	YES
24	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Aleanca e Maqedonasve për Integrimin Europian	Vasil Sterjovski	NO
25	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Lidhja Demokristiane Shqiptare	Mhill Gecaj	YES*
26	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Agrare Ambientaliste e Shqipërisë	Agron Duka	YES
27	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Ora e Shqipërisë	Zef Shtjefni	YES*
28	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Emigracioni Shqiptar	Kostaq Papa	YES*
29	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Bashkimi Liberal Demokrat	Arian Starova	NO
30	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	Shpëtim Idrizi	YES
31	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Republikane Shqiptare	Fatmir Mediu	YES
32	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Lëvizja Demokratike për Ndryshim	Nikolin Staka	YES*
33	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Fryma e Re Demokratike	Sali Shehu	YES
34	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Personat me Aftësi të Kufizuar	Gjovalin Shqalshi	YES*
35	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Rruga e Vërtetë Shqiptare	Muharrem Doda	YES**
36	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia për Europeanizim dhe Integrimin e Shqipërisë	Rivelino Çuno	YES*
37	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Aleanca Arbnore Kombëtare	Gjet Ndoj	NO
38	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Partia Bashkimi Popullor i Pensionistëve Shqiptar	Selami Jenishehri	YES*
39	PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	Aleanca Europiane Ekologjike	Sazan Guri	NO

\* Parties that submitted a financial report declaring zero value (no revenues or expenditures reported).

\*\* Parties that submitted the financial report after the legal deadline, also declaring zero value.

These data indicate that a considerable share of the competing parties either did not fulfil their reporting obligations at all or complied only formally, without reporting any financial activity. In the context of electoral competition organised through coalitions, this pattern suggests a possible concentration of financing and expenditures at the level of the main electoral subject, while the constituent parties appear without independently declared financial activity.

From a transparency perspective, this situation limits the ability to assess whether the parties participating in coalitions contributed financially, benefited from shared resources, or played an active role in campaign expenditures that are not reflected in their individual reports.

In the remainder of this chapter, the analysis focuses on the structure of revenues and expenditures declared by the subjects that reported financial activity, as well as on the distribution of reporting responsibilities within electoral coalitions.

## Declared revenues of electoral subjects

According to the individual declarations submitted by political parties, the total revenues reported for the parliamentary campaign of 11 May 2025 amount to 526,063,950.45 ALL (~5,313,777 EUR). For analytical purposes and to avoid distortions in the aggregated total, these data were adjusted in two ways: (i) by treating internal transfers within coalitions separately in order to prevent double counting in the overall total, and (ii) by excluding revenues partially reported by candidates from some electoral subjects.

After these adjustments, the total revenues analysed in this section amount to 505,896,004.81 ALL (~5,110,061 EUR).

As shown in Table 2, the dominant source in the structure of adjusted revenues is the category "Revenues generated by the subject", amounting to 333,012,911.04 ALL (~3,363,767 EUR), which represents 65.8% of the total. Public funding amounts to 132,735,786.80 ALL (~1,340,766 EUR) or 26.2%, while non-public financing totals 26,293,233.97 ALL (~265,588 EUR) or 5.2%. In-kind donations account for 13,854,073 ALL (~139,940 EUR) or 2.7% of the total. No electoral subject declared loans or credits as a source of campaign financing.

**Table 2: Declared revenues by main categories (gross and adjusted values)**

Category	Value according to individual declarations (ALL)	Adjusted value (ALL)	% of adjusted total
In-kind donations	13,854,073.00	13,854,073.00	2.7%
Non-public financing	26,293,233.97	26,293,233.97	5.2%
Public financing	132,735,786.80	132,735,786.80	26.2%
Loans and credits	–	0.00	0.0%
Revenues generated by the subject	350,012,911.04	333,012,911.04*	65.8%
Candidate revenues (multi-member lists)	3,167,945.64	0.00**	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>526,063,950.45</b>	<b>505,896,004.81</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\* First adjustment: This correction relates to internal transfers within the coalition PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore. The Democratic Party reported in its financial statements several revenues categorised as “Other revenues,” which relate to agreements for covering the coalition’s shared expenses. However, not all of these transfers appear to be recognised symmetrically in the financial statements of the transferring parties. For the purposes of aggregated calculations, the adjusted total eliminates only the portion of transfers that overlaps with declarations made by other parties (i.e., those that risk double counting), amounting to 17,000,000 ALL (~171,717 EUR). Other transfers declared by the Democratic Party that do not have a corresponding reflection in the financial statements of the transferring parties have been treated as revenues and expenditures of the Democratic Party, although this discrepancy will be examined in greater detail in the relevant subsection (“Revenues generated by the subject”), as it raises important questions regarding the consistency and traceability of inter-party reporting within the coalition.

\*\* Second adjustment: This correction relates to amendments to the Electoral Code adopted a few months prior to the elections, which excluded candidates’ revenues and expenditures from the calculation of the campaign spending ceiling. In practice, most electoral subjects interpreted this change as removing the obligation to include candidates’ financial data in party or coalition reports, which resulted in partial and inconsistent reporting. In order to maintain comparability, candidate revenues have been excluded from this analysis. The value excluded from this category amounts to 3,167,945.64 ALL (~31,999 EUR).

### Revenue concentration at the party level

The party-level analysis shows a pronounced concentration of financial resources among the two main political actors, reflecting a considerable gap between them and the rest of the competitors in the electoral race.

The Democratic Party declared revenues amounting to 227,150,137.76 ALL (~2,294,446 EUR), representing 44.9% of the adjusted total revenues. The Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) declared 180,021,311 ALL (~1,818,397 EUR), or 35.6% of the total.

Together, these two parties account for over 80.0% of the total revenues declared for the 2025 parliamentary campaign, leaving only around 19.5% of the total to the 15 other parties that reported independent financial activity. This level of concentration indicates a highly polarised financial structure of the electoral competition, in which the financial capacity of most parties is significantly more limited.

The financial gap becomes even more evident when comparing individual amounts. The difference between the Democratic Party and the third-ranked political actor in terms of declared revenues exceeds 200 million ALL. Even when compared with the Socialist Party, the remaining parties operate with substantially smaller budgets, often below 10% of the financial level of the two main parties.

After the two dominant parties, the actors with the highest financial weight are:

- Partia Socialdemokrate – 22,429,401 ALL (~226,560 EUR) – 4.4%
- Partia Mundësia – 21,569,630 ALL (~217,874 EUR) – 4.3%
- Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet – 9,188,407 ALL (~92,812 EUR) – 1.8%
- Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar – 8,915,018 ALL (~90,051 EUR) – 1.8%

The remaining parties reported revenues of less than 2.0% of the total each, while some declared only minimal or symbolic amounts. This distribution suggests that the financial competition in the 2025 parliamentary elections was heavily concentrated in the hands of two main political actors, leaving relatively limited financial space for the other electoral subjects.

Table 3 presents the declared revenues by party, including the adjustments for internal transfers and the exclusion of candidate revenues for each reporting party.

**Table 3: Declared revenues by party (gross and adjusted values)**

Declaring party	Declared value (ALL)	Transfers within coalition (ALL)	Minus candidate revenues (ALL)	Adjusted value (ALL)	% of adjusted total
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	549,293.41			549,293.41	0.1%
Djathtas 1912	1,986,251.64		(1,986,251.64)	0.00	0.0%
Fryma e Re Demokratike	850,001.00		(850,001.00)	0.00	0.0%
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	3,067,939.60		(264,000.00)	2,803,939.60	0.6%
Lëvizja Bashkë	4,205,416.00			4,205,416.00	0.8%
Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar	8,915,018.00			8,915,018.00	1.8%
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	9,188,407.00			9,188,407.00	1.8%
Partia Mundësia	21,569,630.00			21,569,630.00	4.3%
Nisma Thurje	7,082,095.20		(67,693.00)	7,014,402.20	1.4%
Partia Agrare Ambientaliste e Shqipërisë	7,676,420.00	(5,000,000.00)		2,676,420.00	0.5%
Partia Balli Kombëtar	28,000.00			28,000.00	0.0%
Partia Demokratike	227,150,137.76			227,150,137.76	44.9%
Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	5,872,474.00			5,872,474.00	1.2%
Partia Bashkimi për të Drejtat e Njeriut	896,371.00			896,371.00	0.2%
Partia e Lirisë	11,140,730.00	(7,000,000.00)		4,140,730.00	0.8%
Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit	1,626,996.00			1,626,996.00	0.3%
Partia Republikane Shqiptare	11,808,057.84	(5,000,000.00)		6,808,057.84	1.3%
Partia Socialdemokrate	22,429,401.00			22,429,401.00	4.4%
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	180,021,311.00			180,021,311.00	35.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>526,063,950.45</b>	<b>(17,000,000.00)</b>	<b>(3,167,945.64)</b>	<b>505,896,004.81</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

As a result, although 19 parties appear with declared revenues in total, the analysis in this section is based on 17 parties, as two parties reported revenues only in relation to candidates.

### Structure of revenues by source

The high concentration of revenues at the party level, identified in the previous subsection, is not explained solely by the electoral weight of the main political actors, but also by the way their sources of financing are structured. For this reason, the following analysis examines the distribution of revenues by the main categories declared by political parties, grouping them into three comparative categories: the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë), the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike), and the other parties combined.

As shown in Table 4, the structure of funding sources differs significantly between the two major parties and the rest of the political system. This difference is not related only to the absolute value of the funds, but also to the financial mobilisation model each party followed during the campaign.

At the system level, two findings are particularly important:

First, the dominant revenue category remains “Revenues generated by the subject”, which amounts to 333,012,911.04 ALL, or 65.8% of the corrected total. This indicates that the campaign for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections was financed primarily through internal party resources—existing account balances, accumulated funds, or transfers from central party structures—rather than through new private donations.

Second, public financing accounts for 26.2% of the total, remaining an important but not dominant component. In contrast, “Non-public financing” and

“In-kind donations” together account for less than 8.0% of the total, indicating a relatively limited role of private contributions in the overall architecture of campaign financing.

Overall, this structure suggests a financial model largely reliant on the institutional capacity and accumulated reserves of political parties, rather than on the direct mobilisation of financial support from the electoral base or from new donors during the campaign period.

**Table 4: Structure of revenues by source and party grouping (corrected values)**

Revenue category	Socialist Party		Democratic Party		Other parties		Total (ALL)
	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	
In-kind donations	9,889,608.00	71.4%	270,000.00	1.9%	3,694,465.00	26.7%	13,854,073.00
Non-public financing	1,100,000.00	4.2%	11,051,118.76	42.0%	14,142,115.21	53.8%	26,293,233.97
Public financing	65,291,390.00	49.2%	44,818,545.00	33.8%	22,625,851.80	17.0%	132,735,786.80
Loans and credits	–	0.0%	–	0.0%	–	0.0%	–
Revenues generated by the subject	103,740,313.00	31.2%	171,010,474.00	51.4%	58,262,124.04	17.5%	333,012,911.04
<b>Total</b>	<b>180,021,311.00</b>	<b>35.6%</b>	<b>227,150,137.76</b>	<b>44.9%</b>	<b>98,724,556.05</b>	<b>19.5%</b>	<b>505,896,004.81</b>

A comparison within each revenue category shows that:

- “In-kind donations” are concentrated mainly within the Socialist Party (71.4% of this category),
- “Non-public financing” is more dispersed and dominated by the other parties and the Democratic Party,
- Public financing remains closely linked to parliamentary representation,
- While “Revenues generated by the subject” constitute the element that effectively determines the structural difference between the two major parties and the rest of the political system.

The following sections analyse each revenue category separately, examining their internal structure, reporting practices, and the elements that raise questions from the perspective of transparency and financial traceability.

## In-kind donations

The category “In-kind donations” amounts to 13,854,073 ALL (~139,940 EUR), or 2.7% of the total corrected revenues. Although its relative weight remains limited, this category is important due to its nature, as it requires clarity regarding the type of contribution, the financial valuation, and the identity of the donor.

In total, 248 transactions were recorded under this category, with a highly uneven distribution among the six parties that reported revenues under this item.

**Table 5: In-kind donations by party (value and number of transactions)**

Declaring party	Value (ALL)	No. of transactions
Lëvizja Bashkë	267,500.00	9
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	1,819,335.00	1
Partia Mundësia	1,517,630.00	8
Nisma Thurje	90,000.00	3
Partia Demokratike	270,000.00	1
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	9,889,608.00	226
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,854,073.00</b>	<b>248</b>

The Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) accounts for 71.4% of the total in this category, with 9,889,608 ALL declared across 226 transactions, all originating from individual donors. According to the descriptions in the database, these donations relate to the use of electoral offices, suggesting contributions in the form of providing premises or covering operational costs. The high number of transactions, combined with the homogeneity of donor type, indicates a distributed model of individual contributions.

By comparison, the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) registered only one in-kind donation, valued at 270,000 ALL, from an individual donor. Other parties report smaller volumes but with a more diverse mix of donor types. Lëvizja Bashkë declared nine transactions (eight individuals and one legal entity), Partia Mundësia reported eight transactions (seven individuals and one legal entity), while Nisma Thurje reported three transactions (two legal entities and one individual).

One element that raises questions relates to the way certain contributions have been reported under this category. In some cases, financial reports include aggregated transactions, without providing full details on the identity of the donor or donors, the type of entity, or the specific form of the donation. In the database, for example, donors are referenced as originating from different countries outside Albania, but without additional information on their citizenship. This creates uncertainty regarding the actual nature of these contributions, particularly in cases where they may be linked to activities organised with the diaspora.

Overall, although in-kind donations account for only 2.7% of total revenues, the analysis of this category highlights three elements of interest: the strong concentration within a single party, differences in donor types across parties, and the lack of sufficient detail in some cases. Given that in-kind donations require a financial valuation of non-monetary contributions, the standard of reporting in this category is essential for transparency and public oversight.

## Non-public financing

The category “Non-public financing” amounts to 26,293,233.97 ALL (~265,588 EUR), or 5.2% of the total corrected revenues. In total, 530 transactions were recorded in this category, indicating a relatively dispersed level of private contributions, although their overall weight remains limited, as shown in Table 6 below.

**Table 6: Non-public financing by party (value and number of transactions)**

Declaring party	Value (ALL)	No. of transactions
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	549,293.41	16
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	1,269,969.80	13
Lëvizja Bashkë	3,937,916.00	311
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	7,369,072.00	40
Partia Mundësia	266,000.00	6
Nisma Thurje	721,864.00	19
Partia Balli Kombëtar	28,000.00	1
Partia Demokratike	11,051,118.76	118
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	1,100,000.00	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,293,233.97</b>	<b>530</b>

In absolute terms, the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) reports the highest value of non-public financing (11,051,118.76 ALL), followed by Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet (7,369,072 ALL) and Lëvizja Bashkë (3,937,916 ALL). However, in relation to the overall size of the revenues declared by each party, this category remains secondary for the two main parties, which rely primarily on public funding and revenues generated by the subject itself.

The Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) declared only 1,100,000 ALL in this category, across six transactions. This is particularly notable when compared with its dominance in the categories of in-kind donations and revenues generated by the subject, suggesting a financial mobilisation model less dependent on individual monetary donations during the campaign.

Beyond the absolute values, the analysis of payment methods is essential to understanding not only the level of financial mobilisation, but also the degree of transparency and traceability of contributions.

**Table 7: Non-public financing by payment method**

Payment method	Value (ALL)	No. of transactions
Bank transfer	22,617,065.21	218
Cash	2,608,302.00	240
Credit/debit card	1,067,866.76	72
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,293,233.97</b>	<b>530</b>

Most of the value of non-public financing was realised through bank transfers (22.6 million ALL), which increases the formal level of traceability of contributions. However, in terms of the number of transactions, cash payments dominate (240 transactions), indicating widespread use of this instrument for relatively small donations.

None of the cash transactions exceeded the legal limit of 50,000 ALL, indicating formal compliance with the ceiling allowed for donations made in cash. Nevertheless, the frequent use of cash payments, even within legal limits, reduces the level of transparency compared with bank transfers or card payments.

An analysis of average contribution values reveals clear differences in donation patterns:

For Lëvizja Bashkë, the average bank transfer is approximately 23,067 ALL, while the average cash payment is about 8,425 ALL, reflecting a pattern of small and widely distributed donations.

In the case of the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë), the two recorded bank transfers have an average value of around 497,500 ALL, indicating more concentrated and higher individual contributions.

The Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) shows a more diversified pattern: 40 bank transfers, 6 cash payments, and 72 payments via bank cards, suggesting a more structured use of electronic channels and a diversification of payment instruments.

Several elements of interest emerge from this analysis:

- First, private monetary contributions account for only 5.2% of total revenues, indicating that the 2025 campaign financing relied primarily on public funds and internal party resources.
- Second, although the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) dominates in total revenues and in the category of in-kind donations, it has a very low share in non-public monetary financing, raising questions about its financial mobilisation model compared with other political actors.
- Third, the payment method provides an important indicator of the level of transparency: bank transfers and card payments provide traceable documentation, whereas cash payments, even when within legal limits, remain less verifiable.

In this context, the analytical question that arises is whether the limited reliance on private monetary donations by the largest parties is related to their capacity to finance campaigns through accumulated funds and public financing, thereby reducing the need for broad mobilisation of individual contributions.

### Public financing

“Public financing” amounts to 132,735,786.80 ALL (~1,340,766 EUR), or 26.2% of the total corrected revenues, making it the second most important source of funding after the category “Revenues generated by the subject.” This category includes funds allocated from the state budget for the electoral campaign, in accordance with the formula provided in the Electoral Code and the relevant decisions of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC).

In absolute terms, the largest share of public financing goes to the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë), which declared 65,291,390

ALL, followed by the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) with 44,818,545 ALL. The difference compared with other parties is significant, as the remaining parties receive considerably smaller amounts, in line with their parliamentary weight or their status as new political subjects. In some cases, such as Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar, Partia Agrare Ambientaliste e Shqipërisë, Partia Bashkimi për të Drejtat e Njeriut, or Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit, the declared value of public financing is identical (896,371 ALL), reflecting the standard allocation formula for parties with limited representation.

**Table 8: Public financing by party (declared value)**

Declaring party	Value (ALL)
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	1,533,969.80
Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar	896,371.00
Nisma Thurje	868,445.00
Partia Agrare Ambientaliste e Shqipërisë	896,371.00
Partia Demokratike	44,818,545.00
Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	1,792,735.00
Partia Bashkimi për të Drejtat e Njeriut	896,371.00
Partia e Lirisë	9,140,730.00
Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit	896,371.00
Partia Republikane Shqiptare	2,689,113.00
Partia Socialdemokrate	3,015,375.00
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	65,291,390.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>132,735,786.80</b>

Unlike other revenue categories, no correction has been applied to public financing for internal transfers within the “PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore” coalition. Although several parties within this coalition transferred funds to the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) to cover shared campaign expenses, the financial declarations do not clearly indicate whether these transfers originated directly from the public funds allocated for the campaign or from the category “Revenues generated by the subject” (e.g., account balances or funds accumulated from previous periods). For this reason, any numerical correction in this category would be hypothetical and could distort the analysis. Consequently, the values are presented according to the individual declarations of the parties.

A preliminary comparison with the public data published by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), including the additional funds allocated after the electoral process to new political subjects, suggests that the declared values in this category are generally consistent with the approved funding amounts. However, transfers between parties within coalitions make it more difficult to trace the final destination of public funds, limiting transparency regarding how these funds were actually used at the level of the electoral subject.

From an analytical perspective, public financing remains an important component of the campaign’s financial structure, but not a dominant one. For the two main parties, it represents a significant but not decisive share of total revenues, while for several smaller parties it constitutes a fundamental source of funding. In the context of intra-coalition transfers, the lack of clear identification of the source of transferred funds weakens the principle of individual financial responsibility of each party and makes it more difficult to fully assess the use of public budgetary funds.

### Revenues generated by the subject

The category “Revenues generated by the subject” amounts to 350,012,911.04 ALL according to the gross declarations and 333,012,911.04 ALL after

corrections for overlapping transfers within the coalition, representing 65.8% of the total corrected revenues. This is the dominant source of campaign financing for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections and at the same time the least clear in terms of reference and traceability.

In most cases, parties have used this category to record transfers from the central office, funds accumulated from previous periods, annual funds received from the state budget, or simply “account balances,” without specifying their origin in detail.

The Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike) declared 171,010,474 ALL in this category, all through bank transfers. Of this amount, 144,510,474 ALL are described as “party funds used for the electoral campaign,” while the remainder relates to transfers from coalition allies addressed earlier. The reporting structure is formally clear in technical terms (bank transfers), but not necessarily in terms of the ultimate source of the funds.

The Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) declared 103,740,313 ALL under this category, of which 83,674,245.70 ALL are bank transfers from the central office, divided into 5,874,303 ALL as “account balance 2024” and 77,799,942.70 ALL as “account balance, budget 2024–2025.” The remaining 20,066,067.30 ALL was recorded as transfers from party branches in the districts as membership fees, of which 17,769,686.30 ALL were transferred through the bank and 2,296,381 ALL in cash (38 transactions in total). This raises an important issue: while the 50,000 ALL limit applies to cash donations from third parties, internal party transfers in cash are not prohibited in the same way, but their use reduces traceability compared with banking channels.

Other cases illustrate a lack of standardisation in descriptions. Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar declared 8,018,647 ALL as “annual funds allocated from the state budget, used for electoral expenses.” A similar situation appears with Nisma Thurje, which declared 5,334,093.20 ALL “from the party’s annual budget,” as well as with Partia Agrare Ambientaliste, which referred to “support funds from the Ministry of Finance.”

Partia Mundësia declared 19,786,000 ALL in 35 bank transfers from the party's IBAN, without further clarification on the original source of the funds. The Social Democratic Party (Partia Socialdemokrate) recorded 19,414,026 ALL from the central office, without additional description. PDIU (Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet) declared 4,079,739 ALL as funds available in the party's bank account used for the campaign, while the Republican Party of Albania (Partia Republikane Shqiptare) recorded 9,118,944.84 ALL as a transfer from the current account to the campaign account due to the lack of funds in the latter.

Several structural issues emerge from this overview:

- First, the lack of standardisation in describing the source of funds makes it difficult to distinguish between public financing used as annual funds, funds accumulated from membership contributions, or reserves generated from other activities. In some cases, funds that appear to originate from public allocations have been recorded under this category rather than under “Public financing,” creating conceptual overlap.
- Second, this category largely includes internal transfers between party accounts (from the central office to the campaign account), which artificially increases its weight in the aggregate analysis, without necessarily reflecting new sources of financing.
- Third, in the case of coalitions, the lack of clear identification of the source of funds transferred between parties makes it impossible to determine with certainty whether corrections should be applied to this category or to the public financing category.

In conclusion, “Revenues generated by the subject” appears not only as the largest financial category, but also as the least clear in terms of source reference. This limits the ability to accurately analyse the real dependence of political parties on public funds, accumulated reserves, or other internal sources, and makes this category central to any discussion on the transparency and traceability of political financing.

## Revenues at coalition level: the real concentration of financial power

The analysis so far at the party level shows a high concentration of financial resources in the two main political actors. However, the 11 May 2025 electoral contest took place among 11 electoral subjects, mainly coalitions. For this reason, in order to assess the real financial strength of each competing actor, revenues need to be aggregated at the coalition level, eliminating candidate revenues and internal transfers between parties within the same coalition. After these corrections, the financial landscape becomes even clearer.

**Table 9: Corrected revenues by coalition (value and percentage)**

Electoral subject	Corrected value (ALL)	% of total
PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	249,199,186.60	49.3%
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	180,021,311.00	35.6%
Partia Socialdemokrate	22,429,401.00	4.4%
Partia Mundësia	21,569,630.00	4.3%
Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	16,202,809.20	3.2%
Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	8,915,018.00	1.8%
Lëvizja Bashkë	4,205,416.00	0.8%
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	2,803,939.60	0.6%
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	549,293.41	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>505,896,004.81</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

At the coalition level, financial concentration becomes even more pronounced. The coalition “PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore” accounts for 49.3% of the total corrected revenues, while the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia

Socialiste e Shqipërisë) accounts for 35.6%. Together, these two subjects represent 84.9% of the financial resources declared for the 2025 parliamentary campaign.

The remaining 15.1% is shared among seven other electoral subjects, none of which exceeds the 5.0% threshold of the total. The financial gap between the two main subjects and the rest of the contestants is considerable, reflecting a structural inequality in the financial capacity of the campaign.

Beyond total values, the analysis of the structure of funding sources at the coalition level helps to better understand the financial model of each electoral subject, as shown in Table 10.

**Table 10: Structure of revenues by category at coalition level**

Electoral subject	In-kind donations	Non-public financing	Public financing	Revenues generated by the subject	Total (ALL)
PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	270,000.00	11,079,118.76	61,130,236.00	176,719,831.84	<b>249,199,186.60</b>
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	9,889,608.00	1,100,000.00	65,291,390.00	103,740,313.00	<b>180,021,311.00</b>
Partia Socialdemokrate	–	–	3,015,375.00	19,414,026.00	<b>22,429,401.00</b>
Partia Mundësia	1,517,630.00	266,000.00	–	19,786,000.00	<b>21,569,630.00</b>
Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	1,909,335.00	8,090,936.00	868,445.00	5,334,093.20	<b>16,202,809.20</b>
Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	–	–	896,371.00	8,018,647.00	<b>8,915,018.00</b>
Lëvizja Bashkë	267,500.00	3,937,916.00	–	–	<b>4,205,416.00</b>
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	–	1,269,969.80	1,533,969.80	–	<b>2,803,939.60</b>
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	–	549,293.41	–	–	<b>549,293.41</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,854,073.00</b>	<b>26,293,233.97</b>	<b>132,735,786.80</b>	<b>333,012,911.04</b>	<b>505,896,004.81</b>

The structure above shows that for the coalition led by the Democratic Party, the main share of financing comes from the category “Revenues generated by the subject,” while for the Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë) public financing and internal funds are more evenly distributed. Smaller electoral subjects present different financial models: some rely almost entirely on internal funds (such as the Social Democratic Party – Partia Socialdemokrate or Partia Mundësia), while others show a higher share of non-public financing (such as Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet or Lëvizja Bashkë).

In conclusion, the coalition-level analysis confirms that the financial competition in the 2025 parliamentary elections was highly concentrated. The two main electoral subjects dominated not only in total revenues, but also in their capacity to mobilise internal and public resources, while the rest of the political system operated with significantly more limited financial resources. This financial structure has direct implications for the equality of conditions in the electoral contest and for the real balance of electoral competition.

## Expenditures declared by electoral subjects

According to the individual declarations of political parties, the total expenditures reported for the campaign for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections amount to 516,779,011.35 ALL (~5,221,000 EUR). This amount also includes the outstanding liabilities declared at the end of the reporting period.

For analytical purposes and to maintain consistency with the revenue section, the total expenditures have been corrected in two directions: (i) by excluding the expenditures of candidates from multi-name lists, which will be analysed separately; and (ii) by eliminating internal transfers between parties within the same coalition, in order to avoid double counting of shared expenditures.

After these corrections, the total expenditures analysed in this section amount to 485,491,823.71 ALL (~4,904,969 EUR).

The structure of expenditures by main categories is presented in Table 11.

**Table 11: Expenditures by main categories (gross value and corrected value)**

Expenditure category	Declared value (ALL)	Corrected value (ALL)	% of corrected total
Publications	933,800.00	933,800.00	0.2%
Consultancy	141,724,695.00	141,724,695.00	29.2%
Promotional materials	22,244,797.00	22,244,797.00	4.6%
Media	110,459,388.00	110,459,388.00	22.8%
Social media	27,752,974.00	27,752,974.00	5.7%
Rallies/meetings and campaign events	105,409,395.80*	93,409,395.80	19.2%

Outdoor advertising	20,850,733.00	20,850,733.00	4.3%
Electoral office expenses	20,055,011.00	20,055,011.00	4.1%
Administrative expenses	17,860,832.77*	12,860,832.77	2.6%
Polls	5,498,400.00	5,498,400.00	1.1%
Transport	29,701,797.14	29,701,797.14	6.1%
Candidate expenditures (multi-name lists)	14,287,187.64**	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>516,779,011.35</b>	<b>485,491,823.71</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\* The correction in the category rallies and campaign activities relates to internal transfers declared by several parties within the coalition “PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore,” specifically:

7,000,000 ALL from Partia e Lirisë for shared expenses of the Democratic Party;

5,000,000 ALL from Partia Agrare Ambientaliste for the Democratic Party;

5,000,000 ALL from the Republican Party of Albania (Partia Republikane Shqiptare) (recorded under administrative expenses).

These amounts have been eliminated from the totals to avoid double counting, in line with the revenue section, as they represent shared coverage of expenses within the same coalition.

\*\* Candidate expenditures (14,287,187.64 ALL) have been excluded from the aggregate analysis and will be addressed separately in the analysis of candidate finances.

## Outstanding liabilities

An important element in the analysis of expenditures is the level of outstanding liabilities at the end of the reporting period.

In the financial reports, outstanding liabilities have been included by the subjects as part of the respective expenditure categories, meaning that they have been treated as incurred expenses in accounting terms, even though the payment had not yet been made at the time of reporting. For this reason, they have also been included in the total declared expenditures and in the corrected value analysed in this section.

However, the fact that these amounts have not yet been settled creates uncertainty regarding:

- the method of payment (bank transfer, cash, or another form),
- the timing of settlement,
- as well as whether they will be paid in full or potentially restructured.

Table 12 presents the distribution of outstanding liabilities by expenditure category.

**Table 12: Outstanding liabilities by expenditure category**

Category	Value (ALL)
Outstanding liabilities – Publications	468,600.00
Outstanding liabilities – Promotional materials	453,145.00
Outstanding liabilities – Media	713,781.00
Outstanding liabilities – Rallies/meetings	7,081,890.00
Outstanding liabilities – Outdoor advertising	6,961,233.00
Outstanding liabilities – Electoral offices	436,500.00
Outstanding liabilities – Transport	370,000.00
<b>Total outstanding liabilities</b>	<b>16,485,149.00</b>

The total outstanding liabilities amount to 16,485,149 ALL (~166,515 EUR). In relation to the total corrected expenditures (485,491,823.71 ALL), this represents approximately 3.4% of the total campaign cost.

Although this does not represent a particularly high share in percentage terms, their distribution among electoral subjects is highly concentrated. The data presented in Table 13 show that 83.8% of outstanding liabilities are concentrated in the Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike), while the remaining share is distributed among three other subjects with relatively limited weight.

**Table 13: Outstanding liabilities by declaring parties**

Declaring party	Value (ALL)	% of total liabilities
Partia Demokratike	13,819,837.00	83.8%
Nisma Thurje	1,727,331.00	10.5%
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	567,981.00	3.4%
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	370,000.00	2.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,485,149.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

This concentration suggests that financial exposure extending beyond the electoral period is primarily associated with the main party of the opposition coalition. Since these liabilities are already included in the total expenditure, their impact does not change the reported overall cost of the campaign, but it does affect the analysis of cash flows and liquidity.

From a transparency perspective, it remains important to monitor how these liabilities are settled, as the method of payment (bank transfer or cash) and the timing of settlement may have implications for the full traceability of campaign financing.

### Payment methods

Beyond the structure of expenditure categories, the analysis of payment methods provides an important indicator of the level of formalisation and traceability of campaign financing. Table 14 presents the distribution of expenditures by payment method.

**Table 14: Expenditures by payment method, by value and number of declared transactions**

Payment method	Value of expenditures (ALL)	Number of transfers
Bank	410,413,154.00	675
Cash	9,203,740.71	649
Credit/debit card	6,027,028.00	73
N/A	49,330,793.00	180
In-kind	10,517,108.00	239
<b>Totali</b>	<b>485,491,823.71</b>	<b>1,816*</b>

\* The number of transfers and the corresponding payment method may be slightly affected by the lack of detailed information for the parties *Mundësia* and *Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet*.

Bank transfers account for the overwhelming majority of the total value of expenditures: 410,413,154 ALL (~4,145,588 EUR), or about 84.5% of the corrected total. This indicates a high level of formalisation in the payments made for the campaign.

By contrast, cash payments amount to only 9,203,740.71 ALL (~92,967 EUR), or about 1.9% of the total. However, they were carried out through 649 transactions, a number almost equal to bank transfers (675). This means that cash payments were made in relatively small and fragmented amounts.

On average, a cash payment amounts to around 14,180 ALL, confirming that this channel was used mainly for small operational expenses. Nevertheless, the analysis of transaction descriptions reveals cases where payments to public institutions for the organisation of events (such as the rental of venues, e.g. the National Theatre of Opera and Ballet) were made in cash. Although this practice does not constitute a direct violation, it raises questions about the standard of formalisation in financial relations with public entities.

Credit/debit card payments (6,027,028 ALL; 73 transactions) are mainly related to advertising on social media and digital platforms, reflecting the technical nature of these services and the standard payment method used for them.

A separate category is "N/A", with 49,330,793 ALL (~498,297 EUR) and 180 transactions. This category mainly relates to outstanding liabilities declared at the end of the reporting period. Since these amounts have not yet been settled, the method of payment remains unclear at this stage. In relative terms, the "N/A" category represents about 10.2% of total expenditures, making it important for further monitoring.

Finally, "in-kind" expenditures amount to 10,517,108 ALL (~106,243 EUR) and were recorded in 239 transactions. These represent non-monetary services or contributions that have been financially valued, and therefore require a high standard of documentation to ensure the accuracy of the valuation.

Overall, the structure of payment methods shows that the system relies primarily on banking channels, but with a significant volume of small cash payments and a non-negligible level of outstanding liabilities, which temporarily limits the full analysis of cash flows. This makes it important that transparency assessments do not focus only on the total value of expenditures, but also take into account the channels through which they are carried out.

### Expenditures declared by each party

At the aggregate level, after corrections for internal transfers within coalitions and the exclusion of candidate expenditures, the total expenditures analysed amount to 485,491,823.71 ALL (~4,904,969 EUR).

As presented in Table 15, the distribution of expenditures at the party level confirms the high financial concentration already identified in the revenue section.

**Table 15: Expenditures declared by parties (gross value and corrected value)**

Declaring party	Declared value (ALL)	Movements within coalition	Minus candidates	Corrected value (ALL)	% of corrected total
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	496,730.00	–	–	496,730.00	0.1%
Djathtas 1912	1,798,051.64	–	(1,798,051.64)	–	0.0%
Fryma e Re Demokratike	827,628.00	–	(827,628.00)	–	0.0%
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	13,076,574.00	–	(11,593,815.00) <sup>8</sup>	1,482,759.00	0.3%
Lëvizja Bashkë	3,274,288.00	–	–	3,274,288.00	0.7%
Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar	4,522,808.00	–	–	4,522,808.00	0.9%
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	9,537,366.00	–	–	9,537,366.00	2.0%
Partia Mundësia	21,426,939.00	–	–	21,426,939.00	4.4%
Nisma Thurje	7,082,095.20	–	(67,693.00)	7,014,402.20	1.4%
Partia Agrare Ambientaliste e Shqipërisë	7,676,420.00	(5,000,000.00)	–	2,676,420.00	0.6%
Partia Balli Kombëtar	20,800.00	–	–	20,800.00	0.0%
Partia Demokratike	227,150,138.00	–	–	227,150,138.00	46.8%
Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	5,872,474.00	–	–	5,872,474.00	1.2%
Partia e Bashkimit për të Drejtat e Njeriut	1,287,000.00	–	–	1,287,000.00	0.3%
Partia e Lirisë	10,479,865.00	(7,000,000.00)	–	3,479,865.00	0.7%
Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit	1,626,996.10	–	–	1,626,996.10	0.3%
Partia Republikane Shqiptare	11,808,057.84	(5,000,000.00)	–	6,808,057.84	1.4%
Partia Socialdemokrate	9,350,469.57	–	–	9,350,469.57	1.9%
Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë	179,464,311.00	–	–	179,464,311.00	37.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>516,779,011.35</b>	<b>(17,000,000.00)</b>	<b>(14,287,187.64)</b>	<b>485,491,823.71</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

<sup>8</sup> Në raportin e subjektit Koalicioni Euroatlantik vihet re një mospërputhje e madhe mes vlerës së deklaruar sit ë ardhura nga kandidatët (264,000.00 ALL) dhe shpenzimeve për këtë zë, të cilat janë në vlerën 11,593,815.00 ALL. Kjo diferencë e bën të paqartë burimin e shpenzimeve për kandidatët dhe mund të shpjegohet vetëm si vlerë e siguruar nga të ardhurat e subjektit, e cila më pas është harxhuar nga kandidatët, pa lënë gjurmë në transaksionet e regjistruara.

As with revenues, expenditures are strongly concentrated in the two main political actors:

- Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike): 227,150,138 ALL (~2,295,455 EUR) – 46.8% of the corrected total;
- Socialist Party of Albania (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë): 179,464,311 ALL (~1,812,770 EUR) – 37.0%.

Together, these two parties account for 83.8% of the total corrected campaign expenditures.

The remaining 16.2% is distributed among 15 other parties that reported financial activity, of which only two (Partia Mundësia and Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet) exceed the 2.0% threshold of the total.

This structure confirms a strong concentration of the financial intensity of the campaign in the two main political actors, while the rest of the political system operates with significantly more limited budgets.

In the following part of this chapter, the analysis will move to the level of the main expenditure categories in order to understand not only how much was spent, but also on what and by whom, examining the structure of costs in relation to the electoral strategies pursued.

### Structure of expenditures by category

The structure of campaign expenditures for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections shows a clear concentration in several strategic categories, mainly related to political communication, campaign management, and public mobilisation. Of the corrected total of 485,491,823.71 ALL (~4.90 million EUR), more than two-thirds of the budget was directed toward three main categories: “Consultancy,” “Traditional media,” and “Rallies/meetings.”

As presented in Table 16, “Consultancy” represents the largest individual category, accounting for 29.2% of total expenditures. It is followed by “Media” with 22.8% and “Rallies/meetings and campaign activities” with 19.2%. Together, these three categories represent more than 71% of the total campaign cost, indicating that the main financial weight was concentrated on strategy, communication, and public visibility.

**Table 16: Structure of expenditures by category and main parties (corrected values)**

Expenditure category	Socialist Party		Democratic Party		Other parties		Total	
	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category	Corrected value (ALL)	% within category
Publications	52,800.00	5.7%	669,000.00	71.6%	212,000.00	22.7%	<b>933,800.00</b>	<b>0.2%</b>
Consultancy	–	0.0%	137,650,000.00	97.1%	4,074,695.00	2.9%	<b>141,724,695.00</b>	<b>29.2%</b>
Promotional materials	3,961,791.00	17.8%	1,863,145.00	8.4%	16,419,861.00	73.8%	<b>22,244,797.00</b>	<b>4.6%</b>
Media	51,070,640.00	46.2%	47,168,714.00	42.7%	12,220,034.00	11.1%	<b>110,459,388.00</b>	<b>22.8%</b>
Social media	15,422,100.00	55.6%	5,507,304.00	19.8%	6,823,570.00	24.6%	<b>27,752,974.00</b>	<b>5.7%</b>
Rallies/meetings	68,217,685.00	73.0%	9,790,882.00	10.5%	15,400,828.80	16.5%	<b>93,409,395.80</b>	<b>19.2%</b>
Outdoor advertising	13,200,000.00	63.3%	6,829,752.00	32.8%	820,981.00	3.9%	<b>20,850,733.00</b>	<b>4.3%</b>
Campaign office expenses	12,136,557.00	60.5%	–	0.0%	7,918,454.00	39.5%	<b>20,055,011.00</b>	<b>4.1%</b>
Administrative expenses	2,594,338.00	20.2%	3,195,330.00	24.8%	7,071,164.77	55.0%	<b>12,860,832.77</b>	<b>2.6%</b>
Polls	–	0.0%	5,498,400.00	100.0%	–	0.0%	<b>5,498,400.00</b>	<b>1.1%</b>
Transport	12,808,400.00	43.1%	8,977,611.00	30.2%	7,915,786.14	26.7%	<b>29,701,797.14</b>	<b>6.1%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>179,464,311.00</b>	<b>37.0%</b>	<b>227,150,138.00</b>	<b>46.8%</b>	<b>78,877,374.71</b>	<b>16.2%</b>	<b>485,491,823.71</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

A comparative reading of the expenditure structure highlights a clear strategic differentiation between the two main parties.

The Democratic Party has concentrated almost all spending in the “Consultancy” category (97.1% of this category), as well as all spending on polls (100%). Since “Consultancy” accounts for 29.2% of total expenditures, this indicates a strong orientation toward external strategic services, professional campaign management, and electoral analysis. Structurally, a significant portion of its budget appears to have been channelled toward expertise and strategic planning.

By contrast, the Socialist Party displays a different distribution profile. It dominates spending in “Rallies/meetings and campaign activities” (73.0% of the category), “Social media” (55.6%), and “Outdoor advertising” (63.3%). This configuration suggests a model more oriented toward public mobilisation, field events, and direct communication with voters, both in the physical campaign environment and the digital space.

In the “Media” category—which includes audiovisual and online media, but not social media—the difference between the two parties is minimal: 46.2% for the Socialist Party and 42.7% for the Democratic Party. This indicates a relatively balanced level of investment in traditional and online media, reflecting direct competition in the media advertising market.

Meanwhile, other parties have a more visible share in “Promotional materials” and “Administrative expenses”, but their role in high-volume expenditure categories—particularly “Consultancy” and “Media”—remains limited compared to the two main actors.

One notable element in the reporting structure concerns the absence of declared spending on “campaign offices” by the Democratic Party. Unlike the Socialist Party and several other subjects that reported expenditures in this category, the Democratic Party’s financial report contains no recorded value under this heading. Given that campaign offices typically represent an important component of the campaign’s organisational infrastructure at the local level, serving as spaces for coordinating activities, mobilising party structures and interacting with voters, the absence of such expenditures raises questions about how these costs were classified or recorded. In the absence of further details, it remains unclear whether these expenditures were included under other budget categories, covered by local party structures or candidates, or simply not reported separately in the campaign financial report.

Overall, the expenditure structure shows that the campaign for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections was strongly oriented toward communication and strategic management. The two main parties followed different budgetary

priorities, reflecting distinct organisational models and campaign approaches. “Consultancy” and “Media”—in the sense of audiovisual and online media—constitute the financial backbone of the campaign, while the rest of the system operates with significantly lower financial intensity in the most impactful categories.

The next section of the analysis will focus on the three main categories—“Consultancy,” “Media” (audiovisual and online), and “Social media”—in order to examine in greater detail the concentration of contracts, the nature of expenditures, and elements relevant to the transparency and traceability of campaign financing.

### *Consultancy*

The “Consultancy” category represents the largest expenditure item in the structure of campaign spending for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections, with a total of 141,724,695 ALL (~1,431,560 EUR), or 29.2% of the corrected total campaign budget. This volume makes “Consultancy” not only the largest individual category, but also a key element for understanding the organisational model of the campaign.

The main feature of this category this year is its almost complete concentration among two parties involved in the coalition “PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore,” as well as the fact that the overwhelming majority of funds are linked to foreign consultancy contracts, mainly from the United States, as reflected in the transactions recorded in the table below.

**Table 17: Declared consultancy transfers by parties and suppliers**

Declaring party	Supplier	Value (ALL)
Partia Demokratike	Advancing Strategies	43,500,000.00
Partia Demokratike	Advancing Strategies	45,950,000.00
Partia Demokratike	Advancing Strategies	48,200,000.00
Partia Republikane Shqiptare	Harris Media LLC	3,255,000.00
Partia Republikane Shqiptare	Person fizik	100,000.00
Other parties	–	719,695.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>141,724,695.00</b>

Of the total in this category, 137,650,000 ALL were declared by the Democratic Party through three payments to the company “Advancing Strategies,” while 3,355,000 ALL were declared by the Albanian Republican Party, mainly paid to “Harris Media LLC.” Other subjects reported only 719,695 ALL in total, a value that is almost negligible compared to the overall size of this category.

This means that more than 99.0% of consultancy expenditures are concentrated among two parties, with the remaining share still within the same political alliance. The concentration is not only politically one-sided but also contractually centralised, as the majority of funds were channelled to a single international supplier.

With around 1.39 million EUR paid to a single foreign company, this represents the largest individual expenditure directed to a single supplier across the entire campaign spending structure. This constitutes a new dimension compared to previous elections, where spending on international consultancy did not reach this level of financial weight.

Equally significant is the complete absence of consultancy expenditures declared by the Socialist Party, which reported no payments in this category. This suggests different campaign organisational models: one side relying heavily on external international strategic expertise, while the other, at least according to official declarations, did not use this form of contracting.

From a transparency perspective, this category requires particular attention regarding the nature of the services provided, the duration of the contracts, and their concrete content (communication strategy, digital targeting, electoral analysis, campaign management, etc.). Since these are payments for services rather than donations, they do not constitute direct foreign financing, but they nevertheless raise relevant questions about the international dimension of expertise involved in the campaign.

Overall, “Consultancy” emerges not only as the largest financial category, but also the most politically differentiated and contractually concentrated component of the campaign for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections, reflecting a strong model of professionalisation and strategic outsourcing by one coalition.

#### *Media expenditures*

The “Media” category (including payments and liabilities) amounts to 110,459,388 ALL (~1,115,751 EUR), or 22.8% of the total corrected expenditures for the campaign for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections. This is the second-largest category after “Consultancy” and, as in previous reports, remains one of the main indicators for understanding communication strategy and the allocation of campaign budgets within the traditional media space.

Of the 96 transfers recorded in this category, the amount paid totals 109,745,607 ALL, while 713,781 ALL are reported as unpaid liabilities at the end of the reporting period. The structure by party is presented in Table 18 below.

**Table 18: Structure of media expenditures (audiovisual and online) by declaring parties**

Declaring party	No. of transfers	Amount paid (ALL)	Unpaid liabilities (ALL)	% of total media spending
Lëvizja Bashkë	1	9,240.00	–	0.0%
Lëvizja për Zhvillim Kombëtar	9	3,097,250.00	–	2.8%
Mundësia	1	6,408,356.00	–	5.8%
Nisma Thurje	5	1,542,260.00	602,260.00	1.9%
Partia Demokratike	55	47,057,193.00	111,521.00	42.7%
Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	3	375,668.00	–	0.3%
Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit	3	185,000.00	–	0.2%
Partia Socialiste	22	51,070,640.00	–	46.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>109,745,607.00</b>	<b>713,781.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

The two main parties clearly dominate this category: the Socialist Party accounts for 46.2% of the total, while the Democratic Party accounts for 42.7%. Together, they represent approximately 89% of total media expenditures, leaving only about 11% for all other subjects combined.

The supplier-level analysis reveals a considerable concentration of funds among several major media companies.

**Table 19: Media expenditures by main suppliers and distribution among parties (ALL)**

Supplier	Democratic Party (ALL)	Socialist Party (ALL)	Other parties (ALL)	Total value (ALL)	% of total
TV Klan	12,025,808.00	10,929,350.00	–	<b>22,955,158.00</b>	<b>22.1%</b>
Top Channel	8,748,858.00	9,331,849.00	–	<b>18,080,707.00</b>	<b>17.4%</b>
Media Vizion sha	2,680,644.00	6,011,192.00	–	<b>8,691,836.00</b>	<b>8.4%</b>
MTSC shpk	1,482,810.00	5,000,000.00	–	<b>6,482,810.00</b>	<b>6.2%</b>
Euro Balkans News shpk	1,476,500.00	4,825,600.00	–	<b>6,302,100.00</b>	<b>6.1%</b>
FOCUS MEDIA NEWS	5,609,226.00	–	159,000.00	<b>5,768,226.00</b>	<b>5.5%</b>
G2 MEDIA SHPK	1,887,014.00	1,612,790.00	–	<b>3,499,804.00</b>	<b>3.4%</b>
Ora News shpk	3,439,266.00	–	–	<b>3,439,266.00</b>	<b>3.3%</b>
Top News	–	3,437,350.00	–	<b>3,437,350.00</b>	<b>3.3%</b>
Johaniteri	1,300,000.00	2,000,000.00	–	<b>3,300,000.00</b>	<b>3.2%</b>
32 other suppliers	8,518,588.00	7,922,509.00	5,652,678.00	<b>22,093,775.00</b>	<b>21.2%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>47,168,714.00</b>	<b>51,070,640.00</b>	<b>5,811,678.00*</b>	<b>104,051,032.00*</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\* In the analysis of expenditures by supplier, the total value of 6,408,356 ALL declared by the party Mundësia under the category “Media” has been excluded from the breakdown by individual suppliers due to the lack of detailed information on each transfer.

TV Klan and Top Channel together absorb around 40% of total media expenditures, while the five main suppliers account for more than 60% of the political advertising market declared under this category. This level of concentration is similar to previous electoral cycles and confirms the dominant role of several audiovisual platforms in the distribution of campaign advertising budgets.

Based on the descriptions recorded in the database, the vast majority of payments relate to audiovisual media companies. However, as in previous years, the lack of detailed descriptions does not allow it to be determined whether the transfers were made exclusively for television advertising or whether they also include

promotions on the online portals of these media outlets or on their social media channels. This limitation restricts the analysis of the real distribution between traditional and digital advertising within the same media structures.

Another element of interest is that both main parties appear to have distributed their budgets relatively evenly across several major media outlets, avoiding absolute concentration on a single supplier. The differences in value between them are relatively small in relation to the total, suggesting direct competition and a comparable level of investment in the media space.

Overall, this category confirms that audiovisual and online media (excluding social media) remain one of the main pillars of campaign spending, characterised by high concentration among the two main parties and a small number of dominant suppliers, while the reporting standard remains insufficient to accurately analyse the distribution across specific advertising formats.

### *Social media*

The “Social media” category amounts to 27,752,974 ALL (~280,333 EUR), or 5.7% of the total corrected expenditures for the 2025 campaign. Compared to audiovisual and online media, this category remains significantly smaller in financial volume, but it carries particular importance due to the strategic role that digital platforms play in contemporary political communication.

As shown in Table 20, the Socialist Party accounts for 55.6% of the total in this category, while the Democratic Party accounts for 19.8%. Together, the two main parties represent more than 75% of the declared expenditures on social media.

**Table 20: Social media expenditures by declaring parties (value and relative share)**

Declaring party	Value (ALL)	% of total
Lëvizja Bashkë	91,094.00	0.3%
Lëvizja Shqipëria Bëhet	603,587.00	2.2%
Mundësia	2,192,630.00	7.9%
Nisma Thurje	799,003.00	2.9%
Partia Agrare Ambientaliste	230,000.00	0.8%
Partia Demokratike	5,507,304.00	19.8%
Partia Drejtësi, Integrim dhe Unitet	1,376,956.00	5.0%
Partia e Lirisë	334,000.00	1.2%
Partia Socialdemokrate	1,196,300.00	4.3%
Partia Socialiste	15,422,100.00	55.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,752,974.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

However, the analysis of suppliers reveals an essential element: only a very small portion of these amounts corresponds to direct payments to major digital platforms. Meta (Facebook/Instagram) appears to be practically the only supplier registered as a direct platform, while most payments were made to consultancy companies, communication agencies, or commercial media outlets.

For example, the Socialist Party declared a total of 7 payments in this category, according to the suppliers listed in the table below.

**Table 21: Socialist Party social media expenditures by suppliers (ALL)**

Supplier	Value (ALL)
Euro Balkans News shpk	174,400.00
Top Albania	889,440.00
Dora Communication	2,500,000.00
Faber Media @Produktion GMBH	8,000,000.00
Shqip	491,050.00
G2 MEDIA SHPK	387,210.00
2ND UNIT	2,980,000.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,422,100.00</b>

From these data, it is not possible to determine whether the payments to these companies relate directly to the purchase of advertising space on social media, the production of digital content, the management of online campaigns, or other communication services. Consequently, this category does not allow a direct comparison with the data published in the Facebook Ads Library that were monitored during the campaign.

This situation creates a gap between financial disclosure and the effective transparency of digital advertising. Although the amounts reported under this category are significant, the lack of detail regarding the nature of the services received from each supplier makes it difficult to accurately identify the real volume of sponsored advertising on social media.

In this sense, "Social media" appears as one of the categories where the gap between formal reporting and substantive traceability is most evident. Even though it represents only 5.7% of total expenditures, its political importance

and potential impact on electoral targeting make this category one of the most sensitive for analysing transparency and reporting standards in electoral campaigns.

### Concentration of expenditures at the electoral subject level

The analysis of corrected expenditures at the electoral subject level confirms an even stronger financial concentration than that observed at the party level. Of the total 485,491,823.71 ALL (~4,904,966 EUR), more than half of the campaign cost is borne by a single electoral subject: PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore, with 248,921,750.94 ALL (~2,514,360 EUR), or 51.3% of the total.

The Socialist Party ranks second with 179,464,311 ALL (~1,812,771 EUR), representing 37.0% of the total. Together, the two main political blocs account for 88.3% of total campaign expenditures for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections, leaving only 11.7% of the budget for all other electoral subjects combined.

Beyond the two main subjects, the financial gap becomes significant. The subjects with the largest shares after them are Mundësia (4.4%) and Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet (3.4%), while all other subjects remain below 2.0% of the total. This distribution confirms a strongly polarised financial structure of the electoral contest.

**Table 22: Corrected expenditures by electoral subject (value and share)**

Subjekti zgjedhor	Vlera e korrigjuar (ALL)	% ndaj totalit
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	496,730.00	0.1%
Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	4,522,808.00	0.9%
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	1,482,759.00	0.3%
Lëvizja Atdheu	–	0.0%
Lëvizja Bashkë	3,274,288.00	0.7%
Mundësia	21,426,939.00	4.4%
Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	16,551,768.20	3.4%
Partia Socialdemokrate	9,350,469.57	1.9%
Partia Socialiste	179,464,311.00	37.0%
PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	248,921,750.94	51.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>485,491,823.71</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Unlike revenues, expenditures include a larger number of categories, which makes the analysis more complex. For analytical purposes, Table 23 below presents the distribution across the main categories, which account for the majority of the campaign costs.

**Table 23: Expenditures for the main categories by electoral subject (ALL)**

Electoral subject	Consultancy	Media	Social media	Rallies/activities	Transport
Aleanca Kombëtare Shqiptare	–	–	–	12,300.00	45,353.00
Koalicioni Djathtas për Zhvillim	–	3,097,250.00	–	396,000.00	399,840.00
Koalicioni Euroatlantik	–	–	–	756,474.00	158,304.00
Lëvizja Bashkë	–	9,240.00	91,094.00	658,699.00	593,753.00
Mundësia	–	6,408,356.00	2,192,630.00	979,120.00	370,650.00
Nisma–Shqipëria Bëhet	–	2,144,520.00	1,402,590.00	7,788,337.00	1,718,371.20
Partia Socialdemokrate	–	–	1,196,300.00	3,238,888.80	345,180.00
Partia Socialiste	–	51,070,640.00	15,422,100.00	68,217,685.00	12,808,400.00
PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore	141,105,000.00	47,729,382.00	7,448,260.00	11,361,892.00	13,261,945.94
<b>Total</b>	<b>141,724,695.00</b>	<b>110,459,388.00</b>	<b>27,752,974.00</b>	<b>93,409,395.80</b>	<b>29,701,797.14</b>

The structure presented above confirms that the 2025 parliamentary campaign was strongly concentrated in several strategic expenditure categories with high financial volume, dominated by the two main electoral subjects.

PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore clearly stands out for its extreme concentration in consultancy spending, absorbing virtually the entire amount in this category. This orientation reflects a campaign model heavily reliant on external strategic expertise and a centralised professionalisation of campaign management.

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, displays a different budgetary profile, with a dominant share in rallies and campaign activities, as well as in social media spending. Its investment in traditional media is comparable to that of PD–Aleanca për Shqipërinë Madhështore, suggesting balanced competition in the audiovisual and online media space.

Meanwhile, other electoral subjects show a more fragmented financial engagement, with significantly lower intensity in the strategically high-impact categories. Even when some of them report notable expenditures in specific categories, their overall share of the total remains limited.

Overall, the analysis of expenditures at the electoral subject level highlights three key elements:

- First, the electoral contest in financial terms was essentially polarised between the two main political blocs.
- Second, although both sides invest substantially in media, their strategic priorities differ: one side with a strong focus on consultancy and external services, the other with a stronger orientation toward public mobilisation and direct communication.
- Third, the financial gap between the two dominant actors and the rest of the system is considerable, reflecting a marked asymmetry in the financial capacities of the electoral competition.

In conclusion, this final expenditure structure reflects an electoral system in which the real financial competition takes place between two main actors, while the remaining participants operate with significantly more limited resources.

# Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis of campaign financing for the 11 May 2025 parliamentary elections shows a high financial concentration in the two main electoral subjects, which together account for almost 90% of the total declared revenues and expenditures. This concentration is reflected not only in the level of available funds, but also in the capacity to invest in strategically significant categories, such as consultancy, traditional media, and social media.

The structure of expenditures reveals different strategic models among the main parties: on one side, a stronger orientation toward consultancy and external strategic services, and on the other, a higher investment in public mobilisation and mass communication. At the same time, other parties operate with significantly more limited budgets and with reduced influence in the highest-volume expenditure categories.

From a broader perspective, the report's findings also suggest a significant financial gap between major parties and smaller or newly established subjects in the race. This gap is related not only to the organisational and political capacity of established parties, but also to their access to financial resources accumulated over time, including public funds received from the state budget for annual party activity and additional funds allocated for the electoral campaign. In this context, the fact that over 90% of the revenues declared during the campaign appear as contributions from the electoral subjects themselves raises questions about the transparency and origin of these funds, as well as about the potential impact of such resources in creating substantial financial advantages in the electoral contest.

The amendments to the Electoral Code adopted in February 2025 have also had important implications for the structure and monitoring of campaign financing. The increase of the overall spending limit and the exclusion of candidate expenditures from the spending ceiling applicable to electoral subjects aimed to facilitate campaign organisation for parties and candidates. However, in practice these changes have contributed to the fragmentation of financial reporting and created additional difficulties for the comprehensive monitoring of electoral expenditures. The exclusion of candidate expenditures from the overall spending limit may create space for shifting expenditures from parties to individual candidates, thereby reducing transparency regarding the real scale of campaign financing.

At the same time, the analysis shows that the reporting of candidate revenues and expenditures has been carried out by only a limited number of electoral subjects, and in several cases it has been characterised by significant discrepancies between the declarations submitted by parties and those reported by the candidates themselves. This situation indicates that current reporting and verification mechanisms do not ensure a complete and consolidated picture of campaign financing at the candidate level.

Beyond the analysis of the figures, however, the most significant finding of this report relates to the quality and transparency of financial reporting itself. The process of declaring revenues and expenditures has been characterised by several shortcomings that substantially limit the possibility for effective public and institutional oversight.

First, financial reporting continues to take place long after the elections have concluded, shifting transparency away from the moment when it is most needed—during the campaign itself—to a post-electoral phase, when voters’ decisions have already been made. This significantly reduces the preventive and informational function of the reporting system.

Second, problems with the electronic reporting system, the lack of detailed data for certain subjects, and the submission of unreadable or incomplete documents create serious obstacles for the analysis and verification of funds. In several cases, reports did not contain transaction-by-transaction details, making it impossible to fully trace payments and accurately identify suppliers.

Third, the lack of full standardisation in transaction descriptions and the unclear categorisation of certain expenditures—particularly in categories such as “social media” or “consultancy”—limits the ability to distinguish the real nature of the services obtained. This creates space for interpretation and reduces effective transparency.

Fourth, the existence of unpaid liabilities at the end of the reporting period and their treatment as incurred expenditures raises questions regarding the clarity of payment methods and the real level of financial exposure of the subjects. Although their inclusion in total expenditures is methodologically justified, the actual form of settlement remains unclear in some cases.

Overall, the analysis highlights a reporting system that formally complies with legal requirements but, in practice, faces serious challenges in terms of transparency, public accessibility, and effective oversight.

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## Recommendations

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Financial transparency in elections is not only a legal requirement but also a fundamental element of democratic integrity. While the current system ensures a minimum level of formal reporting, the practice observed during the 2025 elections shows that significant gaps remain that limit effective transparency and public oversight.

Improving reporting standards, strengthening verification mechanisms, and increasing public access to data are essential steps to ensure that political financing in Albania is not only declared, but also genuinely traceable, verifiable, and understandable to citizens.

In light of the findings above, the report proposes the following recommendations:

- *Increase real-time transparency.* Reporting deadlines should be reconsidered by introducing periodic reporting mechanisms during the electoral campaign (e.g. every two weeks), so that voters and the public have access to financial information before election day.
- *Improve the electronic reporting system.* The Central Electoral Commission should invest in a stable, standardised, and mandatory platform for transaction-by-transaction reporting, including required fields describing the nature of the expenditure, the payment method, and the identity of the supplier. The system should also prevent the upload of unreadable or incomplete documents.
- *Standardise expenditure categories and descriptions.* More detailed guidelines should be developed for categorising expenditures, particularly for categories such as “social media,” “consultancy,” and “outdoor advertising,” in order to avoid overlaps and improve analytical clarity.
- *Strengthen institutional oversight and data verification.* The auditing and verification process conducted by the Central Electoral Commission should include substantive checks on the quality and completeness of the data, not only formal compliance with the reporting format.
- *Publish financial data in open data formats.* Financial reports should be published in structured, machine-readable formats (e.g. Excel or CSV) to enable independent analysis by civil society, media, and researchers.
- *Clarify the treatment of unpaid liabilities.* Clear rules should be established on how unpaid liabilities are reported and monitored, including the requirement to declare the method of settlement within a specified period after the elections.
- *Review the impact of the 2025 legal amendments.* The changes that increased the spending limit and excluded candidate expenditures from the electoral subject spending ceiling should be evaluated to determine whether they contribute to maintaining equality of competition or deepen financial disparities among electoral subjects.
- *Strengthen rules on reporting candidate expenditures.* The reporting system should ensure better integration between candidate declarations and those of electoral subjects, in order to avoid inconsistencies and provide a comprehensive picture of campaign financing.
- *Use the findings of this analysis in the legislative reform process.* The findings of this report can serve as an empirical basis for the ongoing review of legislation on political party and campaign financing, helping the relevant institutions and the Central Electoral Commission identify existing gaps and improve mechanisms for transparency and oversight.







**CAMPAIGN FINANCING FOR THE 2025  
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA:**

**SOURCES, EXPENDITURES AND  
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