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Comment: Time to Stop Dithering in Bosnia

26 04 2007  

Peter Palmer

A one-year extension to the OHR isn'tgoing to solve the country's core problems; a new start is needed

By Peter Palmer

As Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares wearily to welcome a new international High Representative with a mandate extended for a further year, what is to be expected of the new incumbent?

Under the unsure hand of the outgoing Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the country slid backwards from achieving such crucial goals as constitutional reform and meeting the requirements for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, SAA, with the European Union.

On police reform, a key condition for an SAA, positions have moved further apart. In response to Bosniak stubbornness, the Serbian parties have retreated from earlier concessions that would have brought the Republika Srpska police under central, state control. On constitutional reform, differences have also hardened since a year ago, when a modest package of changes was narrowly defeated in the state parliament.

In the current polarised environment in which Bosnia and Herzegovina's political leaders are pursuing the divisive ethnic logic of post-Dayton politics with renewed vigour, the political climate seems less propitious now for essential reforms than for several years.

While hoping a new High Representative will get the country back on track, western diplomats in Sarajevo do not expect a return to the interventionism of Schwarz-Schilling's predecessors.

As one put it, the vision of giving responsibility and "ownership" to the Bosnian authorities remains valid. But they would like to see a more energetic High Representative who can provide the direction that has been lacking of late.

Part of the trouble with Schwarz-Schilling, the same diplomat averred, was that his switch to a more hands-off approach was too abrupt. It went too far, too quickly, leaving almost a vacuum.

However, the decision to extend the Office of the High Representative, OHR, does not appear to be underpinned by any visible strategy to get Bosnia and Herzegovina back on the path of reform and European integration.

The one-year extension looks like an anxious reaction to the troubled turn that Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken, as well as to fears of fallout from the unresolved status talks on Kosovo, rather than a reasoned approach to the problems afflicting the country.

International optimism that Bosnia and Herzegovina was reaching a point when it could stand on its own feet has been undermined by the setbacks of the past year.

Schwarz-Schilling himself had concluded by the second half of 2006 that it was too early to shut down the OHR or dispense with the so-called Bonn powers that allow the High Representative to impose decisions or dismiss officials.

Having got cold feet, the country's international overseers have extended the OHR but without giving much consideration to what a new incumbent can expect to achieve in a year.

The opinion of many international officials when Schwarz-Schilling took up office, encouraged by some think-tank gurus, that the country was ready to be treated as a normal pre-EU accession country stands exposed as hopelessly unrealistic.

What then should be the priorities for international engagement? The overarching problem has remained the same for 12 years. Saddled by the 1995 Dayton peace deal with an over-complicated, dysfunctional constitutional set-up that encourages zero-sum, ethnic-based politics, the country is not equipped to carry out the reforms needed for EU integration.

Some progress has been made in building a functioning state by gradually shifting functions to the central authorities and limiting the powers of the entities. Such constitutional change by stealth was the main thrust of Schwarz-Schilling's predecessor, Paddy Ashdown.

It was a slow process. While Ashdown acknowledged, especially in the second half of his mandate, the need for Bosnian authorities to decide on important changes, and not have them forever imposed by the High Representative, what progress was achieved was made possible by his energetic engagement. He persistently cajoled the parties into making the necessary concessions.

Last year's failed US initiative to promote constitutional reform again revealed that while decisions might be made, or not made, by Bosnian politicians and institutions, little can be achieved without committed international engagement.

This is thoroughly unsatisfactory and cannot go on forever. Those who have complained about the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the High Representative's powers are, in this instance, right.

Bosnia and Herzegovina must eventually be capable of running its own affairs, facing challenges itself and entering the EU as a functioning state. But it does not help to pretend that the country is at that point already.

The key question for the new High Representative and for the international Peace Implementation Council, PIC, that appoints him is what it will take to get Bosnia and Herzegovina there?

Ideally, the dysfunctional constitutional set-up agreed at Dayton would be scrapped and a new arrangement put in place that did not enshrine an ethnic division of the country and encourage politicians to put narrow ethnic concerns ahead of the common future of the country.

The Bosniak member of the state presidency, Haris Silajdzic, is determined on just such an overhaul. As the country's international mentors are responsible for the unworkable Dayton constitution, it seems reasonable that they should help clear up the mess.

But apart from Silajdzic and some other Bosniaks, few believe such a radical solution is possible. Ultimately, the representatives of all three constituent peoples will have to agree to any constitutional change, and for the foreseeable future an agreement on radical changes to the Dayton settlement is inconceivable.

So, the sad reality is that transforming the country into a functioning state will be a long process. After 12 years it should be clear that no election will magically bring to power leaders who could make such a system function smoothly. Given the lack of will, either locally or internationally, for anything more ambitious, the best to hope for is further gradual change, slowly pushing forward the boundaries of what is possible.

The nature of the international engagement needs to change, but if progress is to be maintained, the international commitment to helping Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to remain firm for several years. The international community must discard any notion that it can soon declare "mission completed".

The PIC needs to stop its dithering. Either the OHR should remain in place for years to come in order to see through the task of transforming Bosnia and Herzegovina into a functioning EU accession candidate, or it should be closed and the baton definitively handed to an EU Special Representative. He or she should then receive a robust mandate and the necessary resources to tempt, push and cajole Bosnia towards EU integration.

Either course would at least be logical. The decision to extend the OHR for just one year, during which time only limited progress can realistically be expected, makes no sense. Worse, the option of further reviews of the OHR's future holds out the prospect of more panic-induced dithering in future.

The time has come for the OHR to be wound up. The Bonn powers have become little more than an insurance policy for a nervous international community rather than an appropriate instrument for moving Bosnia and Herzegovina forwards.

In the hands of Schwarz-Schilling, who initially declared his reluctance to use them, the powers were used without coherence. In some recent instances, the main purpose of their use seemed to be to preserve the prerogatives and pre-eminence of the OHR, a rather circular argument for retaining them.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's path to becoming a functioning state is crucially linked to its EU integration. That goal unites almost all Bosnians and will continue to encourage their leaders to take the required forward steps. For that reason, it is right that an energetic EU Special Representative, with a strong mandate, fully backed by the United States, should assume the mantle from the OHR.

When the PIC meets in October and again next February, it should confirm the decision to close the OHR in mid-2008. In the meantime, the priority should be to prepare the transition to an EU Special Representative with the necessary robust mandate and resources.

Importantly,the European Commission must stand fully behind the EU Special Representative. For years, Bosnia and Herzegovina will need much more than the kind of assistance the Commission normally offers pre-accession states. What is needed is something more like the EU Special Representative in post-conflict Macedonia; someone able to offer or withhold assistance, hold hands with the elected leaders and, when necessary, bang heads together.

It needs to be someone with a high public profile who can ensure the wider Bosnian society is included in discussions of reform and that the public is informed of what is required and how far their leaders are succeeding or failing to meet EU requirements.

Crucially, the EU needs to be clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina's core problem is its poorly functioning constitutional set-up. Sorting that out should be central to the EU's conditionality for further European integration following the signing of an SAA.

Peter Palmer is a free-lance analyst of Balkan affairs. He previously worked for the International Crisis Group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Balkan Insight is BIRN's online publication.