Serbia: Parties Tussle Over Leadership of Central Bank
14 12 2006 As yet another governor faces a politically-inspired
putsch, calls grow for bank to be made more truly independent and also more
accountable.
By Vesna Hadzivukovic in Belgrade (Balkan Insight, 14 Dec 06)
Radovan Jelasic, current governor the National Bank of Serbia, is
likely to become the third governor since 2003 to be forced from office before
the end of his term.
On November 10, as Serbia’s outgoing parliament passed a
Constitutional Law setting out a roadmap for the country’s constitutional
transition, it prescribed the election of a new bank governor to take place at
the next parliament’s opening session.
Jelasic clings to his job, claiming he is the victim of a
political carve-up. When the decision to choose a new governor was announced in
parliament, the reformist G17 Plus party, to which Jelasic belongs, accused the
big parties, including Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of
Serbia, DSS, and the opposition Democratic Party, DS, of targeting the governor
in a “dirty political deal”.
Serbian politicians agree, telling Balkan Insight that
backroom deals played a direct part in determining the future of the bank’s
leadership.
However, others are questioning the governor’s own
political ties and proposing major changes to make the institution more
accountable. They also question the present nature of the bank’s independence,
with one former governor calling for an overhaul of the bank’s management
structure.
Experts are divided about the legality of Jelasic’s early
dismissal, though Slobodan Vucetic, president of the constitutional court,
defends the move. “When there is a change in constitutional systems, the new
founders, through the Constitutional Law, prescribe a general re-election of
all state organs,” he said. “The interruption of public officials’ mandates is
lawful. It represents usual practice when systems change.”
Jelasic disputes this. “The excuse that a new constitution
equals a new Serbia
does not hold water,” he said. “No other institution – only the National Bank
of Serbia
– is explicitly mentioned in the Constitutional Law. This is reason enough for
me to conclude that this is the result of a political deal.”
Although the governor did not single out individual parties
for blame when he spoke to Balkan Insight, he later accused the DSS and DS of
“trading” his position in an appearance on B92 television.
One politician who took part in the DS-DSS negotiations
that preceded adoption of the Constitutional Law confirmed to Balkan Insight
that a deal over the governor’s post did take place.
He said the two parties bargained away Jelasic’s position
in the interests of forming a coalition with a third party after the next
election. “Jelasic must go in order to clear as much room as possible for
bargains with an eventual third partner,” he said.
G17 Plus performed well in the last election, winning
several cabinet posts, including that of finance minister, held until recently
by Mladjen Dinkic, the G17 Plus leader and himself a former bank governor.
But the party’s fortunes have since faded and in next
year’s elections it may struggle to cross the five-per-cent electoral threshold
needed to enter parliament.
“Even if G17 Plus manages to pass the threshold its
position will certainly be much weaker than before,” the same source told
Balkan Insight.
“The maximum that Dinkic can count on is one
business-related ministry; that is why even the former minister of finance is
ready to send Jelasic down the river,” he continued.
The row over Jelasic’s future has cast light on the central
bank and raised fresh questions about its independence from politics.
“The work of the current governor cannot be described as
politically independent,” said Slobodan Milosavljevic, president of the Serbian
Chamber of Commerce, a senior DS official.
“As a member of a political party, G17 Plus, he was elected
from their list and at their behest… the governor was dominated by the finance
minister [Dinkic] who at the same time was his party boss.”
While horse-trading over senior posts is routine in Belgrade, even some
insiders who have benefited from these political carve-ups now complain that
the practice has become too extreme.
“Our parties see the seizure of power as an opportunity to
divide the plunder - one party gets one sector, the other gets another, and so
on,” said Branko Pavlovic, a former chief of Serbia’s privatisation agency who
now consults public sector trade unions. “They are turning the state assets into
a feudal turf war.”
G17 Plus has been no exception. The party sought and
received leading positions in the fields of finance, banking and securities.
Its trophies include the finance ministry, the bank governorship, the post of
securities and exchange regulator and the deposit insurance agency, amongst
others.
Jelasic has never denied that his route to the governorship
of the bank ran through G17 Plus. His initial post at the bank was deputy
governor under Dinkic. He left office with Dinkic in 2003 when the DS, flexing
its power, kicked them out and installed a loyalist, Kori Udovicki. Her tenure
lasted only a year, however, when another shift in political power brought
Jelasic to the fore as governor.
However, as governor, Jelasic has sharply criticised
profligate spending authorised by the finance ministry under his party
colleague and former boss at the bank, Dinkic. Recently the governor has argued
in his frequent public appearances that his governorship must be judged by its
record, not his political affiliation.
Yet here, too, Jelasic has run into controversy. On his
watch, Serbia’s
monetary policy has been described as overly restrictive. A primary focus of
criticism is the crown jewel of the governor’s policy: the accumulation of
substantial reserves in the central bank.
In November, Serbia’s
cash reserves officially topped 11 billion US dollars, an overestimated figure
according to some critics. The cash designated as “reserve” is not a single
amount, but rather the sum of several kinds of reserve. Some 38.3 per cent of
the total is not Serbia’s at
all but the obligatory currency deposits of commercial banks, held by the
National Bank of Serbia.
The central bank’s own reserves are considerably smaller, around 4 billion US
dollars, while the rest belongs to the state.
Four times in the past 12 months, Jelasic has raised the rate of
deposits required of commercial banks, attempting to discourage overly
aggressive lending.
Yet household lending continues to grow rapidly, despite of high interest
rates, while banks, says Bozidar Djelic, the former finance minister who now
heads operations in south-east Europe for the French bank Credit Agricole,
through the first three quarters of 2006 posted a collective 53 million euros loss.
To minimize the damage, banks with foreign majority offered to
investment hungry companies a way around – to borrow directly from their mother
banks, which contributed to the growth of Serbian debt up to 18.5 billion US
dollars.
Kori Udovicki, Jelasic’s predecessor as governor, currently runs a Belgrade think thank, the
Foundation for the Advancement of Economics. She says cross-border lending has
“skyrocketed” and that “attempts to bring it under control through the
appreciation of domestic currency is like trying to lift a burden by pushing
the short end of the lever”.
Another major central bank success cited by Jelasic is the
taming of inflation, which in recent years threatened to reach double figures.
Recent projections indicate it will fall below the nine-per-cent-level planned
in 2006. But Jelasic is not immune from criticism here, either.
“The central bank is in the uncomfortable position of
choosing between higher inflation and currency appreciation, and neither choice
is brilliant,” said Djelic.
He argues that public spending cuts are a more effective
tool for fighting inflation than monetary measures alone.
Jelasic remains an outspoken advocate of fiscal austerity.
Yet his rivals assert that central bank policy was tailored to enable Dinkic
and the government to avoid painful sacrifices in the months before coming
parliamentary elections.
The appreciation of domestic currency, which has stimulated
growth in imports and brought in higher revenues from excise and sales taxes,
may in fact enable the finance ministry to end the fiscal year with a small
budget surplus.
Suspicions that there is too much political collusion
between the supposedly independent governor and the government has fuelled
calls for greater transparency in bank policy-making.
Jelasic disagrees, saying the Law on the
National Bank of Serbia
is “good enough” and that “the level of independence is affected more by who
the governor is, and how he governs, than any systemic faults”.
But Udovicki is leading calls for a new policymaking
system, based on a committee, which will limit governor’s omnipotence.
“The Law on the National Bank of Serbia gives the governor all the
attributes of independence but not the accountability,” she said. “There is no
complex internal system of management control that can prevent the domination
of a single interest group.
“The governor alone decides, for example, on the closure of
banks. Likewise, there is a monetary board to determine monetary policy, but
the members of that board are nominees of the governor.”
With such extraordinary powers and relatively little
accountability, it is no wonder that political parties compete to control the
post.
Yet while the governor is seen as omnipotent, he also
remains impotent as a tool of political interests larger than himself, noted
Jurij Bajec, a Belgrade
economist.
“Aside from formal
changes in the law we need a political consensus that the central bank should
be a strictly professional, non-partisan, expert institution which, with the
governor, runs a fully independent policy,” said Bajec.
Vesna Hadzivukovic is a freelance
journalist and the executive director of Southeast, a Belgrade-based business
consultancy. Balkan Insight is BIRN`s online publication.