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Kosovo Drifts towards Partition

20 09 2007  As EU officials refuse to rule out Kosovo’s partition, analysts suggest such an arrangement could help resolve the disputed entity’s status.

By Branka Trivic in Belgrade

The EU, Russia and the US say partitioning Kosovo would be an unwelcome solution because it would create a dangerous precedent for the wider region. But they also keep saying they would accept any deal Belgrade and Pristina are ready to agree on, urging both sides to think outside the box and come up with creative ideas.
On September 11 the US embassy in Belgrade underlined Washington’s commitment to fresh negotiations on the future of UN-administered Kosovo, which are supposed to end by December 10.

“During this period of engagement, the United States is prepared to accept any outcome to which the parties agree”, the embassy said, adding however, that after the talks end, Kosovo’s status need to be clarified promptly.

The first one to break the “partition taboo” on August 12 was the EU representative in the “troika” of mediators, Wolfgang Ischinger. At least three other high officials followed suit, hinting at the partition of Kosovo, should such a solution be agreed upon by the two parties.

Officially, Kosovo and Serbia have both rejected the idea of partition, but that stance is seen by many as their maximalist posture at this stage of the process.

Many observers suggest that the Serbian-dominated north of Kosovo will break away from the rest of the entity and become part of Serbia, if Kosovo’s Albanian majority declare independence. Some hold the view that even the Ahtisaari plan, rejected by Serbia, would institutionalise the already existing divide, thus facilitating northern Kosovo’s gradual drift towards Serbia.

The facts on the ground seem to be supporting precisely that course of developments. There has been a quiet process of land swaps between Serbs and Albanians south and north of the Ibar river that runs across the divided town of Mitrovica.

The major international players have long ruled out partition as a solution, arguing that if foreign powers allow the Serbian-dominated north to secede, they will pave the way for similar separatist attempts by ethnic Albanians in the Presevo Valley of Serbia and in Macedonia or by ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, thereby opening a Pandora’s box of Balkan conflicts.

Whatever the risks of a Balkan domino theory might be, the West would not have the means to block partition should the parties manage to reach a deal on it.

Janusz Bugajski of the American Center for Strategic and International Studies says: “The US up to now has been quite adamant that partition is off the table. But presumably, if there is an agreement on the exchange of territory or some other arrangements, which would then lead to an agreement between the two sides, whereby Kosovo recognizes Serbia and Serbia recognizes Kosovo, then, I presume, it means that would be acceptable for the US.”

Despite the fact that both Washington and Brussels claim they do not support or propose partition, Bugajski comments: “If it came to a crunch point and the two sides agreed upon it, it is difficult to see how the internationals would be against it.”

Daniel Serwer of the American Institute of Peace does not favour Kosovo’s partition because it would trigger a chain reaction in the region, but he does not completely exclude such an outcome. He notes, though, that while Belgrade would be ready to take northern Kosovo, it would not be willing to make any territorial concessions involving its Albanian-inhabited Presevo valley as part of a trade-off.
According to many western analysts, the Serbian government would be ready to accept partition , despite the daily “patriotic” mantra against it.

Faced with the prospect of another delay on Kosovo’s status, which may result from a full-blown American-Russian crisis, Albanians too may ultimately back a partition that at least entrenches an independent Kosovo. “With a few exceptions, they want Kosovo ethnically pure”, notes Ian Traynor of the British Guardian newspaper.

Amitai Etzioni, professor at George Washington University, says UN efforts to create a multi-ethnic state have been “a complete failure… The ethnic groups are as far apart as before the war,” he told Reuters. “We need separation”.

His colleague Steven Meyer, of the National Defense University in Washington shares the same view: “The elephant in the room that no one wants to acknowledge is that Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo don’t really want to live together in the same state… Whether we like it or not, that should be respected.”

A few months ago Dimitri Simes wrote in the Los Angeles Times that “a reasonable solution would be to find a compromise that would win Serbia’s support by either falling short of complete independence or by allowing a few areas of Kosovo to remain in Serbia, thus setting a middle-of-the-road precedent for Georgia’s regions as well.”

In the light of the increasing likelihood of Kosovo’s independence, some experts in the western Balkans are making the case for “boundary rectification” between Kosovo and Serbia. Ted Galen Carpenter of the Washington-based Cato Institute holds the view that letting the northern chunk of Kosovo join Serbia would be a damage-limitation strategy for Serbia, offering also a potential for preventing radical nationalist elements in Serbia from destabilising the region.

Even some of those experts who are adamantly opposed to partition point to possible scenarios for Kosovo that leave open the possibility of such a solution in the not-too-distant future.

According to James Lyon of the International Crisis Group, Serbia has already made plans for partition. Belgade wants its ally, Russia, to stall the Kosovo process indefinitely so that the increasingly frustrated Albanians lose patience and declare independence.
This will likely be endorsed by several members of the international community, including probably the US, Britain and some other states that have already indicated their support for Kosovo’s independence.
The EU member-states will probably be bickering among themselves and not be able to act together, as has often happened in the past.
At this point, argues Lyon, Serbia will invoke Security Council Resolution 1244, stipulating that Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia, whose legal successor is Serbia.

Backed by Moscow, Belgrade will claim its right to protect the Serbian population in northern Kosovo from the “illegal” regime in the south. The partition will then be sealed.

The north will probably take an active posture, too. “If Kosovo secedes from Serbia, Serbian-dominated north will secede from Kosovo”, the relatively moderate Kosovo Serb leader, Oliver Ivanovic, warned recently.

Kosovo is already de facto split between some 1.8 million Albanians, who occupy most of the land, and around 50,000 Serbs living in a northern triangle, supported by Serbia as a self-sufficient, parallel society. French soldiers of the 16,500-strong NATO-led peacekeeping force patrol a tense dividing line in Mitrovica. The UN mission has only a minimal presence in this region, and NATO has just 600 American and German soldiers there.

There are also around 60,000 more Serbs living in isolated enclaves among the Albanians, protected by NATO troops.

Serbia will also try to squeeze some advantages from the likely scenario of a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Serbs from these isolated enclaves south of the Ibar, taking such a development as yet another argument to reinforce its case for partition.

The US and major EU nations are expected to back Kosovo’s secession. Analysts point out, however, that it remains to be seen if the West, faced with a looming diplomatic showdown with Russia, which recently put Kosovo on its security “red line”, will keep its resolve to recognize Kosovo’s independence or choose to present partition as the “lesser of two evils”.

In the meantime the slow-motion land swap continues, as Albanians go south and Serbs trickle to the north. A “quiet sell-out” is one crude way of describing where the province might be heading.
The Serbian government is reportedly buying houses owned by Albanians in northern Kosovo, through intermediaries. Alex Anderson of the International Crisis Group says:
“I haven’t seen the paper trail, and there is a reluctance in the Serbian government to admit directly to doing this, but there is a widespread understanding in Mitrovica that this is precisely what is happening.” Meanwhile, according to Anderson, the rich Albanian diaspora is buying up Serb property in central Kosovo, often paying a premium price for it.

Analysts say the creation of such facts on the ground is giving ammunition to those who argue that partitioning could provide the way out of the current deadlock on Kosovo’s status.

Branka Trivic is a correspondent of RFE/RL in Belgrade. Balkan Insight is BIRN`s online publication.



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Komentari:

It is not so simple

Poslao: 2007-09-20 15:03:22,

The article fails to mention the case of Strpce. It has only about 10,000 inhabitants, but its isolated location in the mountains would make it viable as an enclave. The article also forgets the over 100,000 refugees who live in Serbia. Serbia will want some recognition for their fate too. In my opinion a population exchange to get houses for these people should seriously be considered. Ethnic cleansing should not be legalised by treaty. Anderson of the International Crisis Group gives a rather distorted vision when he says that "the rich Albanian diaspora is buying up Serb property in central Kosovo, often paying a premium price for it". There is much money from other Muslim countries involved too. And the premium is usually only for people who live on strategic locations. Many other Serbs can expect to be pressured to sell below the real value.

Partition, and revisiting the Ahtissari Solution

Poslao: 2007-09-24 14:57:14,

Partition was the key sweetener missing from Ahtissari's package earlier this year. Unfortunately, analysts and politicians continue to view partition and the protection of minority rights as being mutually exclusive. They are not, and should not be considered as such. Serbs living under the rule of Prishtina should be afforded constitutional guarantees as in the Ahtissari plan, while Serbs not living under the rule of Prishtina should be allowed to remain in Serbia, where they would enjoy the maximum level of protection. This arrangement gives the maximum number of Serbs (roughly one third) the maximum level of security, allowing them to live under their most preferred outcome. At the same time it provides the remaining number of Serbs with an acceptable outcome where they can live in and return to Kosovo. For the K Albanians, it would give them independence with a UN seat and an even stronger majority within the government institutions. As far as conflict spreading to Presevo, this can be prevented if the international community makes it clear that it will not support the secession of Presevo, an area under the control of Belgrade. This was addressed by Ahtissari's proposal which barred Kosovo from absorbing or uniting with the territories and countries around it. International commitment would dampen the secessionist domino. Ideally, if Prishtina gives guarantees and protection for Serbs in Kosovo, Serbia could reciprocate to the Albanians in Presevo as well as make provisions for K Albanians to return to N Mitrovica.

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